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Comment
REFORMATION OF WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS IN MISSOURI
I. INTRODUCTION
We all make mistakes. The remedy of reformation has developed to
facilitate the correction of errors made in committing aggreements to writ-
ing. The availability of the remedy is the subject of this article. The legal
doctrines will be treated generally with the primary focus on the Missouri
decisions. This comment begins with a general discussion of the remedy,
and then analyzes the theories for relief, the instruments and defects which
may be reformed, the parties to the action, and four defenses-the Statute
of Frlauds,- the petitioner's negligence, the statute of limitations and laches.
At the outset it is important to define some basic terms. The phrase
"complete agreement" is used herein to describe the underlying agreement
which is the "true," "actual" or "real" agreement of the parties. The ad-
jective "complete" implies that the agreement has all of the elements
necessary for it to be enforceable, for a court cannot supply a term which
is essential to an enforceable contract.1 The use of this phrase will provide
consistency in this comment, although the courts often describe the com-
plete agreement with any or all of the adjectives indicated above. The in-
strumentin which the parties have attempted to write down the terms of
the complete agreement will generally be referred to as -the "written in-
strument." The party seeking reformation will often be referred to as the
"petitioner."'
A. History
The forerunner of the reformation remedy developed in Roman law
was the stipulatio.2 Its civil law counterpart is the correction theory8
More important is the remedy of rectification, developed in the English
courts 9£ equity.4 The early common law courts did not..offer affirmative
relief for errors made in reducing an agreement to writing, and even re-
fused to accept parol evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements or
negotiations offered to show that the contract sued upon was not the com-
plete agreement made by the parties. To counteract the law courts' refusal
to look .beyond the written word, the English equity courts fashioned the
remedy of rectification. In time the remedy was widely available:
!. 76 C.J.S. Reformation of Instruments § 11 (1952). Reformation depends
on the existence of a valid contract. McReynolds v. Grubb, 150 Mo. 352, 51 S.W.
822 (1899).
2. Comment, Reformation of Instruments in Louisiana, 30 Tur.. L. Rxv. 486
(1956). The author relied heavily on this commentator's historical discussion at 486.
3. Id. at 486-87. It is interesting that Louisiana, a civil law jurisdiction, has
adopted the Anglo-American remedy of reformation for all instruments except
compromises, for which the correction theory is provided by the Louisiana Civil
Code. Id. at 487.
4. See generally Keeton, Rectification of Instruments for Mistake in England,
14 N.Y.U.L. REv. 319 (1937).
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REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS
The jurisdiction was exercised originally mainly in respect of
marriage settlements which did not correspond with marriage
articles.
... [B]ut it has also been applied to leases and conveyances and
even to voluntary deeds ....
Today, American courts call this equitable remedy reformation.
B. Nature and Effect of the Remedy
1. Equitable in Nature
Despite the modern merger of law and equity in Missouri and in most
states, the fact that the remedy of reformation was a creation of equity is
significant because it means that the issues of fact in a reformation action
will be decided by the court, not by a jury.6 A jury has no power to grant
reformation of a written instrument. Moreover, the equitable nature of
the remedy may also effect the litigants' rights to a jury trial on any non-
equitable issues in the lawsuit.8 Finally, the litigant seeking reformation
should always remember that the equitable remedy is discretionary. This
principle underlies many of the defenses available against the petitioner,
such as laches or petitioner's negligence. The Supreme Court of Missouri
has made the discretionary nature of the remedy very clear:
A court of equity interferes to correct a mistake in a written in-
strument, only for the furtherance of justice; and it is not under
any obligation to correct a mistake, although the fact of mistake
appear ever so plainly, unless it also appear that its interference
is necessary to prevent the perpetration of a fraud or some in-justice: and the party asking relief must stand upon some equity
superior to that of the party against whom he asks it.9
2. Effect of a Decree Granting Reformation
A decree granting reformation of a written instrument relates back
to the time the instrument was executed. In other words, the reformed in-
strument replaces the written instrument effective at the time-the written
instrument was executed.10 This relation back of the reformed instrument
5. Id. at 319 (footnotes omitted).
6. O'Neill, Law or Equity: The Right to Trial by Jury in a Civil Action, 35
Mo. L. REv. 43 (1970); reprinted in condensed form, 27 J. Mo. B. 14 (1971).
7. In Sloss v. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 S.W.2d 446 (St. L. Mo. App.
1961), the plaintiff sought to recover on a fire insurance policy for damage to a
house at 914 Dunklin Street. However, the application and the first duplicate of
the policy showed 906 Dunklin Street as the address of the insured house. Plaintiff
owned houses at both addresses. Plaintiff sued on the policy and obtained a jury
verdict and judgment. But the appellate court reversed, holding that the plaintiff
could not recover on the policy as written and that a jury could not reform the
policy even if the plaintiff had made out a prima fade case for reformation.
8. For an analysis of this problem, see O'Neill, supra note 6.
9. Henderson v. Dickey, 35 Mo. 120, 126 (1864).
10. The decision in Bank of Aurora v. Linzee, 166 Mo. 496, 65 S.W. 735 (1901),
was dependent on this principle. In 1890 defendant executed a deed of trust in
favor of the plaintiff. In 1896 the plaintiff successfuly reformed the description in
the deed of trust. Plaintiff later instituted an action in ejectment. The-trial resulted
1972)
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is the basis for allowing damages for past breaches of the instrument as
reformed, i.e., past breaches of the complete agreement. Consider this
hypothetical situation. A and B entered into a contract. The complete
agreement provided that A would service and repair B's automobile for
twelve months for a stated consideration; however, the written contract
stated the time period was two months. A refused to repair B's car after
two months had passed, but he retained the consideration which was paid
in advance. Since any decree granting reformation would relate back to the
date the written contract was executed, B could recover damages for A's
failure to repair and service his automobile for the last ten months. This is
a common-sense result since A knew or should have known of his obligation
vis-a-vis the written contract.
3. Utility of the Remedy
Reformation may be asserted affirmatively or defensively." More often
than not, the petitioner will seek to reform the instrument and enforce
it as reformed. This may happen in several ways. First, an action for
reformation and for damages for past breaches is possible as illustrated
above.12 It is also possible to obtain specific performance of the agreement
as reformed.' 8 In some cases the party seeking reformation will be the de-
fendapt in the original action brought by the plaintiff on the written in-
strument. The defendant may, of course, join counterclaims for damages
or specific performance along with his counterclaim for reformation. Or,
he may simply rest his defense on the reformation of the written instru-
ment.
14
C. Reformation Versus Rescission
The failure of courts to differentiate between reformation and rescission
has caused a great deal of confusion.1 5 First, the theories of relief are much
different. For example, in a rescission action whether the "mistake" was uni-
lateral or mutual is very important, while it is not important, or at least
in judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed, contending inter alia,
that the trial court incorrectly ignored the homestead right of defendant's wife.
However, any homestead right was derived from a statute passed in 1895, before
reformation was actually granted but after execution of the original deed. The
Supreme Court of Missouri rejected defendant's contention, holding that "the de-
cree of the court, though rendered in 1896, related to the date of the deed of
trust which it reformed, to wit, 1890, and left in defendant only an equity of re-
demption" since his wife could not have had a homestead right before the statute
was passed in 1895. Id. at 500, 65 S.W. at 736. See also Hampton School Dist. v.
Phillips, 470 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Ark. 1971).
11. Leitensdorfer v. Delphy, 15 Mo. 160, 167, 55 Am. Dec. 137, 140 (1851).
See pt. I, § B (2) of this Comment.
12. Smith v. Githens, 271 S.W.2d 373 (Spr. Mo. App. 1954). See Annot., 66
A.L.R. 763, 780 (1930). The rationale for allowing the action for damages in con-junction with the action for reformation seems self-evident: "He [petitioner]
ought not to be put to the trouble first to bring a separate action to reform the
instrument, when a simple averment in a direct action on the instrument would
seem to meet all reasonable requirements." State ex rel. School Dist. v. Delaney,
122 Mo. App. 239, 246, 99 S.W. 1, 2 (K.C. Ct. App. 1906).
13. Henley v. Sullivant, 248 Mo. 672, 154 S.W. 706 (1913).
14. Net Realty & Inv. Co. v. Dubinsky, 94 S.W.2d 1108 (St. L. Mo. App. 1936).
15. See text accompanying note 51 infra.
[Vol. 37
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REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS
should not be important, in a reformation case.' 6 Second, the effect of the
two remedies is very different. The reformation of a contract involves an
effort to enforce it as reformed, whereas rescission involves an effort to
abandon and recede from a contract.17
E quity courts have traditionally been very flexible in shaping relief.' 8
Thus, in cases where rescission is the proper remedy and a decree cancelling
the instrument and placing the parties in the status quo is proper, the
court may offer to the party against whom rescission is sought the option of
accepting reformation of the contract "to make the contract conform to
what the other party thought it should be."' 9 That a court of equity has
this flexibility should not lead one to confuse the two remedies and the
differing bases for relief.
D. Reformation versus Interpretation
It is also important to distinguish reformation from interpretation.
When a petitioner seeks reformation of a written instrument, he is asking
the court to re-write the instrument. When a party seeks interpretation of
a written instrument, he is asking the court to read the instrument and
ascertain its meaning, not to change the words mechanically. 20 However,
the same end may be reached via these two different means. In Herrick
Motor Co. v. Fischer Oldsmobile Co., 21 the plaintiff tried to reach the same
end by both means. However, he failed to distinguish between interpreta-
tion and reformation, and this proved fatal on appeal. In Counts I and II
of his petition, the plaintiff sought reformation of a lease to change the
word "or" to "and." He failed to ask the trial court to interpret the word
"or" so as to mean "and." The trial court gave judgment for the defendant,
and onappeal the plaintiff sought interpretation of the instrument rather
than reformation. The court of appeals precisely discussed the differences
between reformation and interpretation 22 before affirming the decision
because plaintiff had switched theories on appeal.
As pointed out later, courts have traditionally refused to reform some
types of instruments.2 3 As Herrick illustrates, however, they may reach the
same result if asked to interpret the instrument.
II. Troms FOR RELIEF
As usual, the party seeking the aid of equity must show that the
remedy at law is inadequate. In the vast majority of reformation cases this
presents no problem whatever. However, in Berger Manufacturing Co. v.
Phillips Hotel Operating Co., 24 the court reversed a judgment granting
16. 12 C.J.S. Cancellation of Imtruments § 27 (1938). Compare pt. II,§ A (1) of this Comment.
17. 12 C.J.S. Cancellation of Instruments § 6 (1938).
18. H. MCCLINTOCK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 30 (2d ed. 1948) [hereinafter
cited as MCCLINTOCK].
19. Id. at 258-59.
20. See the extensive discussion in 3 A. CoRiN, CONTRACrs § 540 (1960).
21. 421 S.W.2d 58 (Spr. Mo. App. 1967).
22. Id. at 63-64.
23. See pt. III, § A (2) (b) of this Comment.
24. 228 Mo. App. 341, 67 S.W.2d 997 (K.C. Ct. App. 1934).
1972]
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reformation of a contract because the plaintiff could successfully-sue on
the contract as written. It is a rare case when the legal remedy is-ade-
quate. Interpretation of the instrument might be an adequate remedy
when the words are ambiguous, but in most cases the words are clear and
leave no room for interpretation. Certainly, the petitioner should give the
court an opportunity to interpret the written agreement; 25 if the court does
so, it will never reach the reformation issues,
A. When There is a Complete Agreement and the Written
Agreement Varies Materially Therefrom
1. The Analysis
Traditionally, courts have said that the ground for relief is that "the
parties came to an understanding, but in reducing it to writing, through
mutual mistake or mistake and fraud, some provision was omitted or mis-
takenly inserted."2 6 The Missouri courts have generally followed this view. 27
When the courts analyze a fact situation in this manner, they focus on the
cause of the error which appears in the written instrument. Relief'is pred-
icated on the occurrence of mutual acts-or a fraudulent act by one party-
which caused the error. Many scholars have criticized this "ca.ise-act"
analysis because it is misleading.2 8 They argue that the real basis for relief
in a classic reformation case is that there is a complete agreement and the
written agreement varies materially from it. Therefore, the cause of the
variance is unimportant. This argument is put forth very well by Professor
Malone:
If judged by the objective standard of contracts, a true preliminary
agreement has come into being and persisted unimpaired through-
out the negotiations until its reduction to written form is at-
tempted; such an agreement, and such only, can serve as a stand-
ard in determining the accuracy of the contents of the writing.
Under these circumstances, any document which purports to em-
body this agreement and which is nevertheless at variance there-'
with, must necessarily be the result either of a mistake shared by
all of the parties, or the mistake of one party and the fraud of the
other.29
25. See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
26. 45 AM. Jur. Reformation of Instruments § 2, at 584 (1948). In this section
the so-called "classic" reformation cases are considered. The less common types of
cases are discussed in pt. II, § B of this Comment.
27. But see Long v. Greene County Abstract & Loan Co., 252 Mo. 158, 158
S.W. 305 (1913). The court stated that the remedy of reformation would not be
available when there was a unilateral mistake by the party seeking reformation
and fraud by the other party. Later cases have made it clear that unilateral mistake
plus fraud is a ground for relief. See Citizens Bank v. Frazier, 352 Mo. 367, 177
S.W.2d 477 (1944); Strothcamp v. Sandy Ford Ranch, Inc., 440 S.W.2d 193 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1969).
28. Covington, Reformation of Contracts of Personal Insurance, 1964 ILL.
L.F. 548, 549-50; Malone, The Reformation of Writings for Mutual Mistake of
Fact, 24 Gao. L.J. 613 (1936).
29. Malone, supra note 28, at 618.
[Vol. 37
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The "mistake," in Malone's analysis, rests in the assumption by one or both
parties that the written instrument accurately reflects the complete agree-
ment. And if there is a variance between the complete agreement and the
written -instrument, it follows that either both parties erroneously assumed
that there was no variance (mutual mistake) or one party so assumed
while the other party knew that there was a variance (unilateral mistake
plus fraud). Predicating relief on the grounds of mutual mistake or uni-
lateral mistake plus fraud is merely a roundabout way of saying that there
must be a complete agreement and the written instrument must vary
materially from it. In short, the courts seem to have made the theory of
relief unnecessarily complicated. This would be of no concern if the
courts correctly applied this cause-act analysis. However, many courts have
not done so.30 The source of confusion has been the failure of the courts
to recognize that the "mistake" may be an erroneous assumption rather
than an overt act:
UnfortiUnately, .. there have crept into opinions statements seem-
ing to require . . . that the variance between the bargain [com-
plete agreement] and the written instrument result from certain
fixed types of causes .... Such a statement treats "mistake" as if
it is of necessity an act-placing a decimal point in the wrong
place, or transposing words when drafting the instrument reflect-
ing the bargain. This kind of "mistake" is indeed frequently the
cause of variance between the [complete] agreement and the writ-
ten instrument. But "mistake" can also denote a condition, as when
one says "I am mistaken." 31
In two different types of situations this cause-act analysis has caused
Missouri 'courts to reach incorrect results. The first situation is where the
variance. was introduced into the written instrument by the act of a
scrivener. Since the courts said that in the absence of fraud, the mistake had
to be mutual, and since the courts required that the mistake be an act, it
logically.followed that the scrivener who made the mistake had to be acting
as the agent of both parties in order for either party to get reformation of
the instrument. If he was not, the mistake could not be mutual. On the
face of it, this requirement is unsound; the agency of the scrivener is im-
material. It does not matter who caused the written instrument to vary
from the complete agreement. Nevertheless, this requirement-that the
scrivener must have acted as agent of both parties-was stated in many
early Missouri decisions.32
30. The author recognizes that the Missouri courts have almost always reached
"correct' results in the reported cases. However, in the more difficult cases it is
submitted that the correct result is often reached in spite of, not because of, the
analysis employed.
31. Covington, supra note 28, at 549-50.
32. As a matter of historical interest, it should be noted that the very early
decisions in this state correctly disregard this issue. For example, in Cassidy v. Met-
calf, 66K.Mo. 519 (1877), the supreme court assumed that reformation was possible
when the variance was introduced into the written instrument by the plaintiff-
scrivener:
The paper drawn up by the scrivener, who, in this case was the plaintiff
himself, did not correspond with the verbal agreement previously made..
1972] -
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Apparently, the first decision denying relief because the scrivener was
not the agent of both parties was Meek v. Hurst,33 decided in 1909. The
Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
petition, holding that mutuality was not pleaded by the plaintiff since he
alleged only that the scrivener made an error in reducing the agreement
to writing. The court said that mutuality was required and that it "might
arise from the fact that the mistake was the mistake of the scrivener, who
acted as mutual agent of both parties in drafting the contract . . 4 In
reaching this result the court relied on three previous decisions. However,
two involved rescission, not reformation,3 5 and the third was a reformation
case which said in dictum that the scrivener had to act as the agent of
both parties, but found that the scrivener did so act.30 The court also cited
Story's commentary on equity jurisprudence; but a careful reading of the
passage cited shows that it does not support the court's decision.3 7 Thus,
the Meek decision was based on prior cases not really applicable; and it
certainly had no basis in logic or public policy. Nonetheless, the decision
was destined to bother Missouri courts for many years. 38
The Meek doctrine has been rejected in the later decisions. In Snider
v. Miller30 the Springfield Court of Appeals stated that the "only sound
rule" is that "it is immaterial who employed him [the scrivener], or even
that the draftsman is one of the parties." 40 The court discussed three Mis-
souri cases cited as holding that the scrivener must have been the agent
of both parties, 41 but found that in each case the evidence of a complete
agreement was held insufficient. 42 The court did not discuss Meek. The
Snider decision is clearly in line with the other modern decisions in this
state,43 although Meek has never been expressly overruled.
The second situation in which the courts have met with difficulty in
applying the cause-act analysis involves cases where the parties entered into
It is immaterial how or why, this was so, whether by a misunderstanding
of the words or sheer carelessness. The real agreement between the parties
has never been reduced to writing. Id. at 531-32.
33. 223 Mo. 688, 122 S.W. 1022 (1909).
34. Id. at 696, 122 S.W. at 1024.
35. Castleman v. Castleman, 184 Mo. 432, 83 S.W. 757 (1904); Benn v. Prit-
chett, 163 Mo. 560, 63 S.W. 1103 (1901).
36. Williamson v. Brown, 195 Mo. 313, 333, 93 S.W. 791, 797 (1906).
37. 1 J. STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 155 (13th ed. 1886). The pertinent
language is as follows:
[Ejquity interferes in cases of written agreements where there has been
an innocent omission or insertion of a material stipulation contrary to the
intention of both parties and under a mutual mistake.
38. One commentator on the Missouri decisions noted that the "agency of the
scrivener has been a source of difficulty in an action for reformation." Lehr, Ref-
ormation of Deeds for Omission-Mutual Mistake, 23 Mo. L. REv. 97, 98 (1958).
39. 352 S.W.2d 161 (Spr. Mo. App. 1961).
40. Id. at 164.
41. Hood v. Owens, 293 S.W. 774 (1927); Dougherty v. Dougherty, 204 Mo.
228, 102 S.W. 1099 (1907); Brocking v. Straat, 17 Mo. App. 296 (St. L. Ct. App.
1885).
42. Snider v. Miller, 352 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Spr. Mo. App. 1961).
43. Ethridge v. Perryman, 363 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. 1963); Zahner v. Klump, 292
S.W.2d 585 (Mo. 1956).
[Vol. 37
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the detailed written agreement under an erroneous belief with respect to
the existing state of facts. Two parallel cases are illustrative. General Re-
fractories Co. v. Howard44 and General Refractories Co. v. Sebek4 5 were
argued by the same counsel, and the same judge wrote both opinions. None-
theless, the results are not consistent. In Howard the court allowed reforma-
tion of the description in a deed. The court cited the following passage
from Leitensdorfer v. Delphy:
It is not necessary, in order to establish a mistake in an instrument
that it shall be shown that particular words were agreed upon by
the parties as words to be inserted in the instrument. It is sufficient
that the parties had agreed to accomplish a particular object by
the instrument to be executed, and that the instrument as executed
is insufficient to effectuate their intention. 46
In Sebek the plaintiff lessee sought reformation of a lease which gave
plaintiff the right to mine and remove certain materials, including fire
clay, on the defendant's land except within 200 yards of any building.
Plaintiff contended that it should have read 200 feet therefrom, arguing
that the object of the lease was to give plaintiff the right to remove clay
from an existing pit and that said pit was more than 200 feet but less than
200 yards from a building. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's decision to deny reformation. The court first said that the
evidence offered to establish the complete agreement was contradictory and
ambiguous and that it did not believe the parties intended to lease the
rights to the clay pit. This would have been enough for the decision, but
the court went on to show its confusion:
It may be true that both . . . [plaintiff's agent] and Sebek in-
tended that the particular clay pit just referred to should be in-
cluded in the lease. But, even so, it does not follow that the lease
as written does not correctly set forth the contract actually entered
into by the parties. They may have assumed that the pit was not
within 200 yards of any building .... And if the lease was written
just as the parties intended it should be written, that is, correctly
embodies the terms of the contract actually entered into, there is no
ground for its reformation.4
If the court relied upon the above analysis, the decision is undoubtedly
incorrect. At any rate, the court's statement is incorrect. If the parties agreed
that the clay pit was to be included in the lease, reformation would have
been proper despite the fact that the parties mistakenly assumed that the
pit was not within 200 yards of any building. The court needed only to
read its opinion in Howard: "It is sufficient that the parties had agreed to
44. 328 Mo. 1139, 44 S.W.2d 65 (1931).
45. 328 Mo. 1143, 44 S.W.2d 60 (1931).
46. General Refractories Co. v. Howard, 328 Mo. 1139, 1143, 44 S.W.2d 65,
66 (1931), czing Leitensdorfer v. Delphy, 15 Mo. 160, 167, 55 Am. Dec. 137, 140
(1851).
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accomplish a particular object by the instrument to be executed, and that
the instrument as executed is insufficient to effectuate their intention."48
In cases similar to Sebek reformation has been properly allowed when the
petitioner produced sufficient evidence to establish the complete agree-
ment.49
Sebek and Howard, together with the scrivener-agency problem, il-
lustrate the confusion which can arise from the cause-act analysis. More-
over, as the Meek case shows, the use of the phrase "mutuality of mistake"
has sometimes caused the courts to confuse reformation and rescission and
to rely improperly on rescission precedent in deciding reformation cases.50
Although mutuality is important in the rescission cases, the mistake concept
itself and thus "mutuality" is unnecessary in reformation theory:
It is very commonly stated by courts in cases where no fraud is
involved that, to justify reformation, the mistake must be mutual.
This must always be true in the sense that the instrument does not
conform to the actual agreement, and that the parties are ignorant
of the discrepancy. But the use of the term "mutuality" in reforma-
tion cases has been the cause of much of the confusion of these
cases with those where cancellation is sought.51
For these same reasons Professor Malone argued thirty-six years ago
that the courts could more clearly analyze reformation problems if they
discarded the "mistake" or cause-act analysis altogether.5 2 If that is done,
what should be the elements required for a prima facie case for reforma-
tion of a written instrument? The petitioner should have to prove (1) that
a complete agreement exists between the parties, and (2) that the written
instrument varies materially from the complete agreement. Professor Mc-
Clintock makes this clear in his treatise:
It is a presupposition to the granting of the relief that there was
a valid agreement made between the parties which the instrument
they executed failed to express correctly. Neither party was misled
by any mistake or fraud into agreeing to something which he other-
wise would not have agreed to; the contract as reformed will give
to each just what it was intended he should receive. 53
The trouble with the cause-act analysis is that it may lead the court away
from the central issues. The suggested analysis would put the court's focus
where it belongs: on the proof of the complete agreement.
48. General Refractories Co. v. Howard, 328 Mo. 1139, 1143, 44 S.W.2d 65, 66
(1931).
49. See Net Realty & Inv. Co. v. Dubinsky, 94 S.W.2d 1108 (St. L. Mo. App.
1936).
50. See also the confusing statement in Saline County v. Thorp, 337 Mo. 1140,
1144, 88 S.W.2d 183, 185 (1935). The court said that reformation and ordinarily
rescission are only granted where there is a mutual mistake. But the court went on
to say that an exception is made when one party acted fraudulently so that the
parties "never actually agreed to the same proposition." Although rescission has been
allowed in this situation, reformation ordinarily is not. Missouri courts have never
allowed reformation in such a case. See pt. II, § B (1) of this Comment.
51. MCCLINTOCK, § 96.
52. Malone, supra note 28.
53. MCCLINTOCK, § 95, at 256. See also Covington, supra note 28, at 549.
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2. Proof of the Complete Agreement
The heart of the petitioner's case in a reformation suit is the estab-
lishment of the complete agreement; it is, more often than not, the point
at which an unsuccessful petitioner fails. The dilemma of the trier-of-fact
is candidly set forth in a recent decision of the St. Louis Court of Appeals:
If the testimony of plaintiff and her witness... is to be believed,
the proof of plaintiff's right to reformation is clear .... On the
other hand, if the testimony of [defendant] and his witnesses is
true, the judgment should go against plaintiff .... Therefore, the
disposition of the case is largely dependent upon a question of
credibility of the witnesses. 54
In very many cases the problem of proof is made even more difficult be-
cause considerable time has elapsed since the instrument was executed.
Witnesses to the transaction are unavailable or, at best, their memories
are badly faded.
a. Admissible Evidence
The initial question is: What is the effect of the parol evidence rule?
That rule normally operates to exclude evidence of oral negotiations prior
to or contemporaneous with any written agreement which is contradictory
to the written agreement. 55 It should be self-evident that parol evidence
must be admitted in suits for reformation. Historically, the remedy of
reformation arose primarily because the parol evidence rule precluded the
common-law courts from looking beyond the written instrument.58 So,
reformation suits are by definition exceptions to the parol evidence rule.
If the parol evidence rule was a bar, this rule designed as a protection
against fraud would aid the very fraud it was intended to prevent.57 Even
in the earliest reformation cases the Missouri courts have recognized this
principle. 58
The next question is: What type of parol evidence will the courts
admit to establish the complete agreement? There would appear to be no
limits in Missouri except the facts of the case and the petitioner's ingenuity.
Quite naturally, Missouri courts admit evidence of the written instrument
in its entirety. 59 In addition, evidence of the subject matter of the agree-
ment, the usages of the business, the relationship of the parties, the motives
of the parties in making the complete agreement, and the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the written instrument is admissible.60 Also
54. Sparks v. Sparks, 388 S.W.2d 508, 516 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
55. 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 851 (1964).
56. See pt. 1, § A of this Comment.
57. 45 Am. JuR. Reformation of Instruments § 113 (1943).
58. See Employers' Indem. Corp. v. Garrett, 327 Mo. 874, 884, 38 S.W.2d
1049, 1053-54 (1931).
59. In Leitensdorfer v. Delphy, 15 Mo. 160, 166, 55 Am. Dec. 137, 139 (1851).
the court found no necessity for going outside of the written instrument to ascer-
tain the complete agreement.
60. See St. Louis 221 Club v. Melbourne Hotel Corp., 227 S.W.2d 764, 768(St. L. Mo. App. 1950); Chandler v. Hale, 219 Mo. App. 133, 152, 268 S.W. 691,
698 (K.C. Ct. App. 1925).
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very important in many cases is the conduct of the parties subsequent to
the execution of the instrument. In Maze v. Boehm61 plaintiff sued to
quiet title to certain real estate. The defendant counterclaimed for reforma-
tion of deeds in his chain of title and in plaintiff's chain of title. To es-
tablish the complete agreement (that defendant's predecessors in title
should receive the real estate in question), the defendant offered evidence
of his possession of the land and the possession by those preceding him in
his chain of title. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that this evidence
was admissible to show "the good faith of defendants and their intention
in the transaction which was the origin of their claim."O-2
On the other hand the party against whom reformation is sought may
introduce these same types of evidence to show that the written instru-
ment does not vary from the complete agreement. In Nelson v. Grice3 the
defendants used evidence of the surrounding circumstances to defend
against reformation. The plaintiff Nelson sought reformation of a lease.
The defendant lessors introduced evidence to show that Mackey, the
lessee preceding Nelson, was told by them to get plaintiff's attorney to
prepare a lease "just like the one" Mackey had. The court looked at
Mackey's lease for evidence of the complete agreement and denied reforma-
tion.
b. The Weight of Evidence Required
Certainly, the party seeking reformation bears the burden of estab-
lishing the complete agreement. 64 However, the question is: what is the
standard of proof he must satisfy? A brief reading of the Missouri decisions
leaves no doubt that reformation can be granted when the evidence of the
complete agreement is conflicting. In fact, this is almost always the situa-
tion in the litigated cases. But, since the evidence is being admitted con-
trary to the mandate of the parol evidence rule, and in some cases seem-
ingly contrary to the Statute of Frauds, 65 it is only natural that courts re-
quire more than a mere preponderance of the evidence. Missouri courts
have used a variety of phrases to describe the weight of evidence required;
in fact, the words seem to change from one opinion to the next:
The establishment of such [complete] agreement has in some cases
required proof that is clear, cogent, and convincing; other cases
requred that the proof need not be beyond a reasonable doubt;
while others required proof such as to leave no reasonable
doubt .... 66
61. 281 Mo. 507, 220 S.W. 952 (1920).
62. Id. at 513, 220 S.W. at 954.
63. 411 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. 1967).
64. Meredith v. Holmes, 105 Mo. App. 343, 352, 80 S.W. 61, 63 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1904):
Correlated to this [parol evidence] rule is the rule in equity suits to cor-
rect a written contract, on the ground of mistake, that casts upon the
party asserting the mistake the burden of overthrowing ... the prima facie
presumption that the contract exhibits the ultimate agreement of the
parties ....
65. See pt. V, § A of this Comment.
66. Lehr, supra note 38, at 98. The latest pronouncement by the Supreme
Court of Missouri is that petitioner must show an agreement "by dear, cogent,
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Regardless of what descriptive words are proper to describe the weight
of evidence required in Missouri, the trial judge is the trier of fact, and
the difference in wording is not likely to have much influence on him.
The petitioner must simply persuade him that the complete agreement did
indeed vary from the written instrument. The Missouri Supreme Court
early stated the truth of the matter:
Although it is said, that the evidence required to prove a mistake
when it is denied must be as satisfactory as if the mistake were ad-
mitted, yet this and similar remarks of judges, however distin-
guished, form no rule of the law to direct courts in dispensing
justice. When the mind of a judge is entirely convinced upon any
disputed question, whether of fact or law, he is bound to act upon
the conviction.67
8. The Mistake of Law Problem
The courts in this country broadly state that equity will not reform a
written instrument when the variance arose from a mistake of law.68 Such
a situation would arise, for example, if Jones agreed to convey to Smith
only a life estate in Blackacre, but because of Jones' erroneous assumption
as to the words used in the deed, he actually conveyed a fee simple interest
in Blackacre. Although the courts state the above proposition as a general
rule, they rarely, if ever, have relied upon it to deny relief to a petitioner
such as Jones:
In suits for reformation, the attitude of the courts toward a mis-
take of law is very similar to that adopted by them where the suit
is for cancellation, that is, they are very apt to state the rule to be
that there can be no reformation for such a mistake but to find
that the particular case comes within an exception to the rule so
that the relief is granted.69
The most recent pronouncement on this proposition by the Missouri
Supreme Court was in State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Schwabe.70
That case arose out of proceedings to condemn certain land of the de-
fendants. The defendants counterclaimed for reformation of a deed by
which they had previously conveyed land to the Missouri State Highway
Commission. In the counterclaim they alleged that the parties' complete
agreement provided that the defendants would retain a right of access to
the highway and that the deed failed to do so. The state did not dispute
the proposition that the deed varied materially from the complete agree-
ment, but rather urged that equity would not reform the deed because
the choice of vords ineffective to reserve a right of access was a non-
convincing evidence, beyond a preponderance of the evidence and so as to leave
no room for reasonable doubt ...." American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bach, 471
S.W.2d 474, 477 (Mo. 1971).
67. Leitensdorfer v. Delphy, 15 Mo. 160, 167, 55 Am. Dec. 137, 140-41 (1851).
68. Hunt v. Rousmaniere's Adm'r, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1, 15 (1828). See also 76
C.J.S. Reformation of Instruments § 27 (1952).
69. MCCLINTOCK, § 97, at 262.
70. 335 S.W.2d 15 (Mo. 1960).
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reformable mistake of law. The supreme court held that on. the facts pre-
sented it would grant reformation of a mistake of law. It relied on the
Corrigan v. Tiernay7l exception to the general rule: "[E]quity will grant
its relief.., although the failure may have resulted from a mistake as to
the legal meaning and operation of the terms or language employed in the
writing."72
In reviewing the Missouri decisions, the Corrigan court found a further
exception to the "rule" that equity will not reform a mistake of law: when
the mistake of law is mixed with a mistake of fact.73 This exception can,
of course, be very broad depending on how the courts determine whether
a mistake is purely a mistake of law.74
While the decision in Schwabe was based on one of the exceptions
found in Corrigan, it is significant to note that the Schwabe court indicated
in dictum that it disapproved the main proposition:
The best-considered modern cases recognize that the main object
of equitable jurisdiction should be to effectuate the intention of
the parties to the instrument, and that any mistake made by them
which would defeat such intention should be corrected in equity,
irrespective of the question whether the mistake is one of law or
of fact.76
In his treatise Professor McClintock states that there is only one
instance when a mistake of law cannot be reformed: when the parties
agreed on the particular instrument, though their selection of it was in-
duced by a mistake as to the legal operation of the instrument.78 In sup-
port of this assertion, McGlintock cites the famous case-of Hunt v. Rous-
maniere's Administrators.77 Hunt wanted security for a loan he made to
Rousmaniere. The latter was prepared to give him any type of security;
but, on the advice of his attorney, Hunt asked for a power of attorney
authorizing sale of a ship owned by the debtor. Hunt died without exer-
cising the power. The first time this case appeared before the Supreme
Court (on a demurrer to the bill),78 the Court held that the power of at-
torney expired at Hunt's death. The plaintiffs then brought an action to
71. 100 Mo. 276, 13 S.W. 401 (1890).
72. State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Schwabe, 335 S.W.2d 15, 20 (Mo.
1960), citing Corrigan v. Tiernay, 100 Mo. 276, 280, 13 S.W. 401, 402 (1890)
(emphasis added). This is a well-recognized exception to the mistake of law doc-
trine. See Annot., 135 A.L.R. 1452 (1941).
73. Corrigan v. Tiernay, 100 Mo. 276, 280, 13 S.W. 401, (1890). Note also that
there is another exception which applies when an applicant for insurance correctly
states his interest in the property and asks for insurance thereon, and the agent
of the insurer agrees to comply with his request and to decide on the form of the
policy, but by mistake of law adopts a form which does not cover such an interest.
Erickson Refrigerated Transp., Inc. v. Canal Ins. Co., 474 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Spr.
Mo. App. 1971).
74. See discussion in 2 F. CooPER, STATE ADMInSTRATrva LAw 665-67 (1965).
75. State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Schwabe, 335 S.W.2d 15, 21 (Mo.
1960). See also McIntyre v. Casey, 182 S.W. 966 (Mo. 1916).
76. MCCLINTOCK, § 97, at 262.
77. 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 1 (1828).
78. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 174 (1823).
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reform the power of attorney so that it could become effective as a chattel
mortgage, alleging in effect that there was a complete agreement to provide
security. Reformation was denied at trial and the Supreme Court affirmed.
Although the Court made sweeping statements that equity would not reform
a mistake of law, the precise holding of the case is that there was no com-
plete agreement to provide security, i.e., that the complete agreement called
only for Rousmaniere to execute a power of attorney.79 Thus, Professor
McClintock might have been more accurate if he had said that when
parties have agreed on a particular instrument it will probably be im-
possible for a chancellor to find a complete agreement to serve as the basis
for the reformation of the instrument even though their selection of it was
induced by a mistake as to its legal effect.80 The Hunt result can thereby
be explained without resort to the mistake of law doctrine.
There is no sound policy supporting the proposition that courts should
not grant reformation where the variance arose because of a mistake of
law. As stated earlier, the cause of the variance of the written instrument
from the complete agreement is not important. Once the complete agree-
ment is established, the object of the court should be to effectuate the in-
tention of the parties, and this object should be carried out unless there is
some overriding policy consideration not present in this situation. As in-
dicated in Schwabe, the Missouri Supreme Court has seen the merit in
this argument and may well remove the vestiges of this rule in a future
decision. In any case, the rule has little application since the courts have
developed so many exceptions to the general rule. In Missouri there is ap-
parently no decision denying reformation on the ground that equity would
not reform a mistake of law.
B. Possible Exceptions When the Written Agreement Does
Not Vary from the Complete Agreement
The normal requirements for a prima facie case for reformation of a
written instrument are two: first, that a complete agreement exists between
the parties, and second, that the written instrument varies materially from
the complete agreement. But there are other instances where reformation
should be available even though the written agreement does not vary from
the complete agreement. Some are discussed herein.
79. The language of the Court so indicated:
[I]f he [Rousmaniere] had totally refused to execute the agreement, and
the plaintiff had filed his bill, praying that defendant might be compelled
to execute a mortgage instead of an irrevocable power of attorney, could
that court have granted the relief specifically asked for? We think not...
[Equity] has no power to make agreements for parties, and then compel
them to execute the same.
Hunt v. Rousmaniere's Adm'r, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 1, 14 (1828).
80. In one situation American courts will give a written instrument the legal
effect of another type of document. If, for example, A conveyed Blackacre to B
by warranty deed but there was an oral agreement that the property would be held
as security for A's debt to B, some courts would allow A to prove the oral mortgage
in spite of the Statute of Frauds. Scott, Conveyances Upon Trusts Not Properly De-
clared, 37 HARv. L. Rxv. 653, 662 (1924). The deed absolute would be declared a
mortgage and given the effect thereof. ONeill v. Capelle, 62 Mo. 202 (1876).
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1. Fraud in the Inducement
Suppose Smith induces Jones to buy his late model automobile by
representing that it has been driven only 10,000 miles -when in fact it has
been driven 110,000 miles. Jones purchases the automobile for $3,000,
but its market value is much lower-say $2,500-because it has been driven
so many miles. Can Jones get the sale contract reformed so that he will only
have to pay $2,500 (the actual market value) in toto?
The general rule is, of course, that Jones cannot get reformation, for
the written instrument does not vary from the complete agreement; the
parties agreed on $3,000. However, the New York Court of Appeals
strayed from this principle in Brandwein v. Provident Mutual Life Insur-
ance Co.8 In that case the plaintiff alleged that defendant had entered
into an agent's agreement with the plaintiff; that the plaintiff had originally
refused to enter into the agreement because as it was written commissions
would not be vested in plaintiff if the agreement was terminated; and that
defendant's officer had induced plaintiff to sign the agreement by repre-
senting that a vesting provision would be recorded in the official records
of the defendant corporation. The plaintiff prayed for reformation of the
written instrument to include the "side agreement" (the vesting provision).
The supreme court dismissed the complaint, and the appellate division of
the supreme court affirmed. But the court of appeals reversed, holding that
plaintiff stated a cause of action for reformation. If the standard analysis
is applied, this decision is incorrect. Since the side agreement was merely
an inducement to the making of the contract, that side agreement did not
become a part of the complete agreement. Thus, the written instrument
did not vary from the complete agreement.8 2
The question posed here is whether an exception should be made for
cases of fraud in the inducement: Should reformation be available not-
withstanding the fact that the normal requirements are not met? The
policy has always been that it is not the function of equity to punish a
defendant by forcing a bargain on him which he never made. On the other
hand, Professor Malone has asked: "Is there any reason that a defendant
should not be forced to fulfill the terms of a fraudulent representation
made by him even though it did not reach the dignity of being a part of
the agreement itself?"8 3 Certainly, Brandwein-as well as Jones, our hypo-
thetical car buyer-should have had some remedy. But reformation may not
have been his only remedy even though, as the majority opinion noted,
the oral side agreement was unenforceable because of the Statute of
Frauds.8 4 At least one commentator has argued that the Brandwein court
could have reached the same result via another theory.8 5 He believed that
81. 3 N.Y.2d 491, 146 N.E.2d 693, 168 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1957).
82. The term "complete agreement" may be a bit confusing here; in this case
it is the agent's agreement. This does not include the side agreement or vesting pro-
vision which was not intended to be part of the agent's agreement but was used to
induce plaintiff to enter into the agent's agreement.
83. Malone, The Reformation of Writings for Mutual Mistake of Fact, 24
Guo. L.J. 613, 614 n.1 (1936).
84. Brandwein v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 3 N.Y.2d 491, 495-96, 146
N.E.2d 693, 695, 168 N.Y.S.2d 964, 967 (1957).
85. Note, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 124 (1958).
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the court should have disregarded the plaintiff's prayer for reformation and
read the complaint as a tort action for fraud or deceit; then the application
of New York's "loss of bargain" rule of damages would have placed the
plaintiff in the same position as if reformation had been granted.6 Sim-
ilarly, in the hypothetical, Jones could bring an action for rescission and a
tort action for fraud. If the "loss of bargain" rule of damages is the measure
of recovery, success in the two actions amounts to specific enforcement
against Smith of his fraudulent representation regarding the mileage.
In summary, when the writing expresses the complete agreement cor-
rectly but one party's assent was obtained by fraud, that party's remedy
is rescission not reformation.
[I]f his assent was induced by an antecedent unilateral mistake, he
may perhaps get rescission and restitution, but he is not entitled to
reformation.
In cases of this kind, the court often says as a reason for denying
reformation that this mistake was not "mutual." The true reason
back of this, however, is that the plaintiff is trying to enforce a con-
tract that the defendant never agreed to.87
It is possible to reach a just result via rescission and fraud actions provided
that the jurisdiction follows the "loss of bargain" rule of damages. Since
Missouri is such a jurisdiction,8 8 there is no need to make an exception in
Missouri from the standard requirements for reformation.8 9
2. Hardship
Suppose our friend Jones-who has a habit of making bad deals-is a
contractor, and he agrees to supply and install all the sewer pipe needed
in Smith's new subdivision. Both parties think that nine-inch pipe will be
adequate, and the contract price is set with that in mind. However, it turns
out that twelve-inch pipe is required. Supplying the twelve-inch pipe causes
contractor Jones to suffer financially, but he supplies the pipe because he
has labor contracts to fulfill and he doesn't want to lose his other contracts
with Smith. Can Jones get reformation of the contract to provide for a
greater price? Of course, under the normal requirements he cannot make
86. Id. at 131.
87. 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 614 (1960).
88. See Miller v. Wilson, 381 S.W.2d 31, 38 (St. L. Mo. App. 1964), and cases
cited therein.
89. Brandwein appears to be the only case of fraud in the inducement where
reformation has been held an appropriate remedy although Professor McClintock
cites Hugo v. Erickson, 110 Neb. 602, 194 N.W. 723 (1923), as such a case. McCLiN-
TOCK, § 100 n.68. The defendant, Erickson, represented that all of a lot was included
in the sale, but the deed conveyed only part of the lot. The court granted reforma-
don so that the deed would convey all of the lot. McClintock says there was no
complete agreement to sell the lot and that reformation was granted to compel the
defendant to make good his representations. However, under the modern objec-
tive theory of contracts, there was a complete agreement. The court appeared to
recognize this. If so, Hugo is no more than a standard reformation case. It is this
writer's opinion that none of the cases cited by McClintock stand for the proposi-
tion that reformation may be granted where there was fraud in the inducement.
See MCCLaNTOCK, § 100.
19721
16
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [1972], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss1/8
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
out a case because the written instrument does not differ from the com-
plete agreement. The normal rule is that hardship is not grounds for
reformation: "[W]here parties to an agreement are ignorant of facts which,
if known, would have caused a different contract, the remedy is rescission
and not reformation."9 0
However, the United States Court of Claims granted reformation in a
case factually similar to the hypothetical. In National Presto Industries,
Inc. v. United States,91 the parties contracted for the production of 105-mm
shells at a fixed price. Both parties thought that certain lathes or plunge
grinders would not be necessary in the production process; but, as it turned
out, they were necessary in order to produce shells of the required quality.
Plaintiff produced the shells and later instituted an action for reformation
to raise the contract price. The Court of Claims allowed reformation so
that the contract would provide that the parties would split the cost of
the extra work and equipment. Even though the evidence was contradictory,
the court held that the defendant did not agree to be responsible- for the
omission of the lathes and also that the contract did not expressly put the
risk on the plaintiff. The court found that defendant would have paid at
least part of the cost of the lathes if they had been thought necessary and
that defendant had benefited from the extra work:
For such a case it is equitable to reform the contract so that each
side bears a share of the unexpected costs . . . Reformation, as
the child of equity, can mold its relief to attain any fair-result
within the broadest perimeter of the charter the parties have estab-
lished for themselves.9 2
No other jurisdiction has ever followed the lead of the Court of Claims,
which admittedly changed the reformation ground rules in this case as it has
in other government contract cases.9 3
In two recent cases the Supreme Court of Missouri has denied reforma-
tion sought basically on the ground of hardship. Croy v. Zalma Reorganized
School District R-V 9 4 involved a contract for the sale of land. Both parties
entered into the contract without knowing whether a certain building was
on the land to be conveyed. The building was not on the land, so plaintiff-
buyer sued for reformation of the deed to include in the description the
land on which the building actually sat. The court denied reformation,
holding that plaintiff had gambled that the building was on the land he
purchased and that he did not state a cause of action because the written
instrument did not differ from the complete agreement. In German Evan-
gelical St. Marcus Congregation v. Archambault,95 plaintiff'oWned land
which was dedicated and used for cemetery purposes. Defendants were
90. Harley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 378 Ill. 19, 27, 37 N.E.2d 760, 764
(1941). See Annot., 137 A.L.R. 908 (1942).
91. 167 Ct. Cl. 749, 338 F.2d 99 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965).
92. Id. at 769, 338 F.2d at 112.
93. See also Note, Equitable Adjustment of Government Contracts, 42 N.Y.U.L.
R v. 302 (1967).
94. 434 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. 1968).
95. 383 S.W.2d 704 (Mo. 1964).
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burial lot owners. Plaintiff sought a decree authorizing abandonment, re-
moval of remains and sale of the property; but it had obligated itself under
perpetual care contracts to maintain 2,290 grave sites, more than ten per
cent of the total in the cemetery. The court said: "[T]he mere fact that
an obligation has become burdensome affords no basis for relief [reforma-
tion of the contracts]."96
Thus, Missouri follows the almost universal rule that hardship or
unfairness is not a ground for reformation of a written instrument. Of
course, rescission is available on those grounds;9 7 but rescission is not
possible when the contract has already been performed, as in National
Presto and our hypothetical. Therefore, the question remains whether hard-
ship in such cases should be grounds for reformation in spite of the fact
that the written instrument does not vary materially from the complete
agreement. The problem is that the court would have no basis for rewriting
the written instrument. On what basis would the court determine the terms
of the new contract the petitioner would have it write for the parties? Can
the court write a new contract acceptable to both parties? The logical
response is that the courts should not try. In those cases where the rescission
remedy is not adequate, the parties must simply live with their agreement.
As so many courts have said: "The court cannot supply an agreement that
was never made."9 8
One question remains: What bearing, if any, does hardship have on
a reformation case if it is not a basis for relief per se? This writer suggests
that hardship has a very definite bearing on reformation cases because it
is a factor which cuts toward finding a complete agreement which varies
from the written instrument. If the bargain as written is very harsh on the
petitioner, his case will probably be more credible. Since proving the
complete agreement is the most difficult part of petitioner's case, hardship
will be very important to a petitioner even though not sufficient for relief
per se. Although it is difficult to get actual data to support this thesis,99 it
is borne out in the language of the St. Louis Court of Appeals in Sparks v.
Sparks.oo Several written instruments were involved in that case, all of
which were part of a financial agreement between the parties which in-
cluded the sale of a business from plaintiff to defendant. Plaintiff alleged
that defendant fraudulently changed the term for payment from ten years
to twenty-five years when he drew up the instruments and also that he
fraudulently prepared the main instrument so that it purported to be a
testamentary disposition of plaintiff's interest in the $45,000 deed of trust,
so that payments on the principal would be extinguished when plaintiff
died. The plaintiff, a seventy-four-year-old widow, also alleged certain other
irregularities and sued to reform the main financial agreement, the deed
96. Id. at 713.
97. Sims v. Sims, 101 Mo. App. 407, 74 S.W. 449 (St. L. Ct. App. 1903). But see
Chelrob, Inc. v. Barret, 293 N.Y. 442, 57 N.E. 825 (1944), where the court in effect
reformed a contract on the ground of hardship because the parent corporation was
benefiting from a low price at the expense of its subsidiary.
98. E.g., Tesson v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 40 Mo. 33, 36, 93 Am. Dec. 293, 295.
(1867).
99. Hardship may often be an unarticulated factor in the court's decision.
100. 388 S.W.2d 508 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
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of trust, a promissory note and a chattel mortgage. Relief was granted. The
court found that the complete agreement existed as plaintiff alleged and
went on to say:
We might add that said finding seems amply supported by other
considerations not the least of which was the unconscionable bar-
gain which defendant, who we find stood in a confidential rela-
tionship with plaintiff, will have made unless the contract as
written is not [sic] reformed. 101
Although the wording might have been better, 02 the point is clear that
the hardship on the plaintiff was taken to support plaintiff's proof of the
complete agreement.
It is surprising that the Court of Claims did not take- this approach in
National Presto since there was indeed a great hardship on the plaintiff.
Rescission, the normal remedy, was unavailable because the contract had
already been performed. Thus, an unfavorable decree in the reformation
suit would have been very hard on the plaintiff. But the court refused to
find a complete agreement even though the evidence was at least mildly
in favor of such a finding.103 Surely, if the trier-of-fact had found a com-
plete agreement, the court would have affirmed. However, without such a
finding, the court was forced to take a more radical course.1 04
3. The Cy Pres Doctrine
A third exception to the rule that reformation may not be granted
when the written instrument does not vary from the complete agreement is
based on the cy pres doctrine. In several types of cases courts, by approxi-
mating1 05 the intention of the testator or grantor who made the instru-
ment, may utilize this doctrine to salvage a written instrument which would
otherwise fail. First, where property is given in trust for a particular char-
itable purpose and it is impossible or impracticable to carry out that pur-
pose, a court may direct the application of the funds to some charitable
purpose falling within the general intention of the testator.106 Clearly, this
is judicial reformation. The major limitation is that the court must find
that the testator had a general charitable intent.'07 The test is not clear-cut,
101. Id. at 516 (emphasis added).
102. From the context it is clear that the court did not mean to add the word
"not" at the end of the sentence. Also, the court might have chosen a better word
than "unconscionable." It was used by the court to indicate simply that the bargain
as written was very harsh on the petitioner.
103. 167 Ct. Cl. 749, 750, 338 F.2d 99, 101 n.1 (1964).
104. Note, however, that the final result was more favorable to the government.
If the court had found a complete agreement that the government was to bear the
cost of the lathes, the government would have paid all of the extra cost. As the
court actually reformed the contract, the government paid only half.
105. "The phrase Ecy pres] is in the Anglo-French and is equivalent to the
modern French si pres, meaning so near or as near. The intention of the testator
is carried out as nearly as may be." A. ScoTt, Tausrs § 399, at 3084 (3d ed. 1967).
106. A leading case is Thatcher v. City of St. Louis, 335 Mo. 1130, 76 S.W.2d
677 (1934). See generally A. Scorr, supra note 105, §§ 395-401.
107. See Ramsey v. City of Brookfield, 361 Mo. 857, 237 S.W.2d 143 (1951);
A. Scorr, supra note 105, § 399.
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but in general the court will exercise its cy pres powers if there is some
indication that the testator intended that the property should be applied
for charitable purposes even if the particular purpose should fail.108 The
cy pres doctrine is, strictly speaking, applicable only to dispositions for
charitable purposes. However, even with respect to private trusts the court
may to a limited extent permit a modification of the trust in order to
prevent its failure. The court may permit or direct a deviation from the
terms of the trust if owing to circumstances not known to the settlor and
not anticipated by him compliance with the terms would defeat or sub-
stantially impair the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust.10 9
Secondly, when a limitation otherwise void under the rule against
perpetuities can be reformed to come within the rule while still conforming
as nearly as possible to the intention of the grantor, settlor or testator,
some courts will so reform it, some pursuant to statute, some without
statutory authority.110 Whatever the Missouri courts' common law powers,
they now have statutory cy pres power to reform and salvage that part of
the limitation which violates the rule against perpetuities.111
108. Ramsey v. City of Brookfield, 361 Mo. 857, 862, 237 S.W.2d 143, 145-46
(1951).
109. See, e.g., St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Ghio, 240 Mo. App. 1033, 222
S.W.2d 556 (St. L. Ct. App. 1949). See A. ScoTr, supra note 105, § 167.
110. See generally L. SImMs & A. SMITH, THE LAw OF FUTURE I,'rERsrs § 1256(Supp. 1972); Browder, Construction, Reformation, and the Rule Against Per-
petuities, 62 MicH. L. Rrv. 1 (1963).
Before the common law Rule Against Perpetuities was developed, the English
courts established a rule that a limitation to the children of an unborn life tenant
was not effective. Haddon's Case, cited in Perrot's Case, 72 Eng. Rep. 634, 637
(K.B. 1594); Whitby v. Mitchell, 44 Ch. Div. 85 (1890); In re Nash, [1910] 1 Ch. 1.
In applying this rule the English courts followed a cy pres doctrine under which
they reformed dispositions which violated the rule so as to carry them out as far
as permitted by law, usually by changing the interest of the unborn life tenant into
an estate tail. Humberston v. Humberston, 24 Eng. Rep. 412 (Ch. 1716). The
English courts did not follow such a cy pres doctrine in applying the modern Rule
Against Perpetuities. The American courts have tended to reject altogether the
rule in Whitby v. Mitchel, supra, and to follow the English precedents in re-
fusing to reform cy pres limitations which violate the modern Rule Against Per-
petuities. The application of cy pres in the perpetuities field in this country is new.
Nine jurisdictions have statutes authorizing it; at least four states have applied it
without statutory authority. See L. SIMEs Q A. SMir, supra.
111. § 442.555, RSMo 1969 provides (in part):
2. When any limitation or provision violates the rule against perpe-
tuities or a rule or policy corrollary thereto and reformation would more
closely approximate the primary purpose or scheme of the grantor, set-
tlor or testator than total invalidity of the limitation or provision, upon
the timely filing of a petition in a court of competent jurisdiction, by any
party in interest, all parties in interest having been served by process, the
limitation or provisions shall be reformed, if possible, to the extent neces-
sary to avoid violation of the rule or policy and, as so reformed, shall be
valid and effective. When such a petition is filed in a probate court the
matter shall be transferred to the circuit court.
It has never been decided whether Missouri courts have the power to reform
limitations to which this statute does not apply. Whether or not the statute is
applicable to a given case will depend on several factors, including the statute's
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Ill. INSTRUMENTS AND DEFEGTs WHICH MAY BE REnoMvn
A. Types of Instruments
1. General
By the very nature of the remedy, there must be a written instrument
which is the object of the reformation. 112 It may be executory or executed." 83
Unlike rescission, there is no need to convince the court that the parties
can be put back in the status quo as it was before the instrument became
effective. 114 As illustrated in National Presto, this will sometimes be im-
possible after the agreement is executed. 1 5 In this sense, reformation is
a broader remedy than rescission.
Petitioners have sought and successfully obtained reformation of many
different types of instruments."16 In Missouri, for example, petitioners
have successfully reformed contracts, 1 7, deeds," :8 contracts to convey
land, 1 9 deeds of trust, 20 leases,' 2 ' promissory notes, 22 surety bonds, 2 3
chattel mortgages, 24 assignments, 2 5 certificates of deposit' 26 and insurance
policies. 12 7 With few exceptions the type of instrument is really not im-
portant, and the basic theory of relief will not vary. The theory of relief for
reformation of a multi-million dollar contract is the.same as that for ref-
ormation of a $100 promissory note.
2. The Exceptions
Although the type of instrument is generally unimportant, courts of
the various jurisdictions have refused to grant the equitable remedy of
reformation for three types of instruments for overriding policy reasons.
112. 76 C.J.S. Reformation of Instruments § 8 (1952).
113. Leitensdorfer v. Delphy, 15 Mo. 160, 167, 55 Am. Dec. 137, 140 (1851).
114. Johnson v. Crowley, 191 S.W. 690 (Mo. 1916); 12 C.J.S. Cancellation of
Instruments § 44 (1938).
115. See text accompanying notes 91-93 supra. The plaintiff in National Presto
tought reformation of the contract price after plaintiff had already performed its
end of the bargain. At that point it would have been impossible to put the parties
back in the status quo. Thus, rescission was unavailable although reformation was
granted.
116. See generally 76 C.J.S. Reformation of Instruments § 13 (1952).
117. Smith v. Githens, 271 S.W.2d 374 (Spr. Mo. App. 1954).
118. Leitensdorfer v. Delphy, 15 Mo. 160, 55 Am. Dec. 137 (1851).
119. Henley v. Sullivant, 248 Mo. 672, 154 S.W. 706 (1913).
120. Etluridge v. Perryman, 363 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. 1963).
121. St. Louis 221 Club v. Melbourne Hotel Corp., 227 S.W.2d 764 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1950).
122. Conrath v. Houchin, 226 Mo. App. 261, 34 S.W.2d 190 (K.C. Ct. App.
1930).
123. State ex rel. Frank v. Administrator of Frank, 51 Mo. 98 (1872).
124. David Plaut Sec. Co. v. Cooper, 258 S.W. 455 (K.C. Mo. App. 1924).
125. Net Realty & Inv. Co. v. Dubinsky, 94 S.W.2d 1108 (St. L. Mo. App.
1936).
126. Merchants & Planters Bank v. Brewer, 177 S.W.2d 540 (Spr. Mo. App.
1944).
127. Schimmel Fur Co. v. American Indem Co., 440 S.W.2d 932 (Mo. 1969).
The incontestible clause has generally been held no defense to reformation. See
Covington, Reformation of Contracts of Personal Insurance, 1964 ILL. L.F. 548, 567.
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These rules are by no means uniform, however, and the decisions of a
particular jurisdiction should be consulted for its position.
a. Sheriffs' Deeds
Some jurisdictions will not grant reformation of instruments executed
under power conferred by statute, i.e., sheriffs' deeds. 128 In Missouri this
exception is not important today because there is a statutory method for
correction of mistakes in sheriffs' deeds. 129 Missouri courts have held that
the statutory method is exclusive and have denied reformation on that
ground.'3 0 Of course, the statutory remedy will be needed only when the
sheriff is no longer available to execute a new deed.
b. Wills
Nearly all courts hold that wills may not be reformed; 131 only Ten-
nessee clearly holds to the contrary.' 3 2 Missouri is, therefore, a member
of the majority.' 3 3 One Missouri decision went so far as to hold that certain
deeds could not be reformed because it was held that they were "to be
regarded as part of and read into the will."8 4
There are strong policy considerations behind the decisions to make
wills inviolate. Two commentators made this judgment:
The right to devise property did not exist at common law prior to
the Statute [of Wills]. Hence the reformation of a will would
constitute the passage of title by way of devise in a manner con-
trary to the terms of the Statute. Furthermore, it is probably
believed by the courts that a reformation of such a proceeding
would open the door to countless ill-founded claims and doubtless
to fraud.'3 5
128. Ware v. Johnson, 55 Mo. 500 (1874), afrd, 66 Mo. 662 (1877). See gen-
erally 76 C.J.S. Reformation of Instruments § 13 (1952).
129. § 513.335, RSMo 1969 provides:
When any officer shall die, be removed from office or disqualified, or shall
remove from this state, after the sale of any property and before executing
a conveyance therefor, as required by law, or after executing a defective
conveyance therefor, the purchaser, his grantee, or any one claiming by,
through or under the purchaser. may petition the court out of which the
execution issued, stating the facts, verified by affidavit, and if said pe-
titioner satisfy the court that the purchase money has been paid, the court
shall order the sheriff then in office to execute, acknowledge and deliver
a deed to the purchaser, or if he be dead, to his heirs, and if the purchaser
has sold the same, to his grantee, or to the party claiming by, through or
under said purchaser reciting the facts; which deed shall be executed ac-
cordingly, and shall have the same effect, to all intents and purposes, as
if made by the officer so deceased, iemoved from office, disqualified or ab-
sent from the state (emphasis added).
Mo. R. Civ. P. 76.58 is identical.
130. Hill Inv. Co. v. Peter Gerlach Co., 293 S.W. 102 (Mo. 1927); Dixon v.
Hunter, 204 Mo. 382, 102 S.W. 970 (1907).
131. See Annot., 90 A.L.R.2d 924, 933 (1963).
132. Eatherly v. Eatherly, 41 Tenn. 461, 78 Am. Dec. 495 (1860).
133. First Natl Bank v. Solomon, 412 S.W.2d 458 (Mo. 1967).
134. White v. Reading, 293 Mo. 347, 363, 239 S.W. 90, 94 (1922).
135. Malone & Keesee, The Reformation of Writings Under the Law of Missis-
sippi, 8 Miss. L.J. 329, 344 (1936).
1972]'
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Thus, the decision to refuse categorically the equitable relief of reforma-
tion is probably a sound one.
However, the courts do construe wills and may accomplish the same
result as reformation via construction. As noted earlier,136 the practical
effect of interpretation 37 and reformation is the same. In theory, a court
cannot construe unambiguous language in a will; but ambiguity can be
found in the strangest places. 138 Practically, the words in the instrument
impose some restraint on construction of that instrument, whereas they
are in theory no restriction at all in a suit for reformation. Thus, within
some indefinite bounds formed by the words used in a will, a court can
"reform" a will via construction.
[A]ithough the generally accepted view is that a will cannot be
reformed, the same result is accomplished under the name of
"construction", and when a court construes a will as passing title
to a devisee or legatee whose name is omitted, or substitutes for
misdescribed property or beneficiary not answering the descrip-
tion in the will, it is in effect "reforming" the will. What the courts
undoubtedly mean by holding that a will cannot be reformed is
that a suit for reformation (as for reformation of a contract or a
deed) is not the appropriate remedy, but that the appropriate
remedy is a suit for construction. 3 9
c. Trustees' Deeds-Deeds of Trust After Foreclosure
Suppose that Jones purports to have purchased two improved city lots,
#1 and #2, at a foreclosure sale for a bargain price. Although the parties to
the deed of trust also intended and assumed that improved lots 1 and 2
were described in the deed of trust, in the sale advertisement and in the
trustee's deed to Jones, unimproved lots 3 and 4 were actually described
in all three instances. Jones wants to get his deed (and the deed of trust)
reformed so as to invest himself with title to the more valuable lots 1 and
2. The question is whether a purchaser can get reformation, after the
foreclosure sale, of an erroneous description originating in the deed of
trust. If Jones is in Missouri, he cannot.140 In Schwickerath v. Cooksey' 4 1
the court held that a purchaser could not get reformation of a trustee's
136. See pt. I, § D of this Comment.
137. Strictly speaking, construction of a written instrument is not the same as
interpretation. The former is a broader "remedy." See Herrick Motor Co. v. Fischer
Oldsmobile Co., 421 S.W.2d 58, 64 n.1 (Spr. Mo. App. 1967). However, the differ-
ence is not important to this discussion. But see note 139 infra.
138. See, e.g., Patch v. White, 117 U.S. 210, 215-16 (1886).
139. Annot., 90 A.L.R.2d 924, 928 (1963). See, e.g., Patch v. White, 117 U.S.
210 (1886). The question at issue was construction of a will. The Court held that by
"lot numbered six in square four hundred and three" the testator intended to
describe lot numbered three in square four hundred and six. Corbin's analysis is
that if such a mistaken description was in a contract-and the only alternative to
reformation was interpretation, not construction-the appropriate remedy would be
reformation because the court could not reach this result by interpretation. S
A. CORBIN, CONimacrs § 540, at 88 n.63 (1960).
140. On this question the discussion will be limited to the Missouri deed of
trust and the decisions in this state. See generally Annot., 172 A.L.R. 655 (1948).
141. 53 Mo. 75 (1873), See also Haley v. Bagley, 37 Mo. 363 (1866).
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deed (or the deed of trust) in order to invest himself with title to the
land. Relief was denied even though the written instruments clearly varied
from the complete agreements (1) to mortgage the land and (2) to sell
the land. 142 The policy behind this rule seems reasonable. Although pur-
chaser Jones intended to buy lots 1 and 2, lots 3 and 4 were advertised
as the real estate which was to be sold at the foreclosure sale. So, the
courts are justifiably concerned that the erroneous advertisement may
have chilled the bidding at the sale.143 That unimproved lots 3 and 4
were advertised (and described in the deed of trust) as the lots for sale
may have been the reason that Jones "purchased" the improved lots at a
bargain price.
Although it is not possible for the purchaser at a foreclosure sale
to reform his deed, he can possibly have the deed of trust reformed and
then try to purchase the land at a second foreclosure sale. The recent case
of Ethridge v. Perryman,144 with facts similar to the hypothetical, sets
forth the proper procedure. The mortgagee, who had purchased at the
foreclosure sale, alleged that he and the mortgagor had intended that lots
1, 2 and 8 be described and included in the deed of trust and that the
scrivener had mistakenly described only lot 3. After determining that there
was a complete agreement as alleged,145 the Missouri Supreme Court held
that only the deed of trust could be reformed and ordered another fore-
closure and sale by the proper description.140 This procedure protects
the interests of the original debtor-mortgagor as well as a mortgagee who
was not the purchaser at the original foreclosure sale. It eliminates the
possibility of a low sale price stemming from the erroneous description in
the deed of trust and sale advertisement.
B. Defects Correctable
The range of defects which may be corrected is broad. In general,
the variance of the written instrument from the complete agreement must
be material.' 4 7 The court may strike subject matter not embraced in the
complete agreement, supply omitted provisions, 143 insert words which more
dearly express the complete agreement, and, in theory at least, give the
written instrument the effect of a totally different type of written instru-
ment.14 In short, when a proper case is made out, the court may do
142. Accord, Colin v. Moldenhauer, 338 Mo. 827, 92 S.W.2d 601 (1936).
143. Cf. Schwickerath v. Cooksey, 53 Mo. 75, 80 (1873).
144. 863 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. 1963).
145. Id. at 699.
146. "[Elquity has jurisdiction on a proper showing made to correct the de-
scription in the original mortgage and to order another foreclosure and sale by the
proper description .... Id. at 703. For other jurisdictions which take this approach,
see Annot., 172 A.L.R. 655, 670 (1948).
147. 76 C.J.S. Reformation of Instruments § 25, at 351 (1952).
148. Two qualifications must be made. First, the power to supply omitted pro-
visions does not give the court power to supply a term to the "complete agreement"
which is essential to a valid contract. See text accompanying note 8 supra. Second,
some states hold that the Statute of Frauds is a bar to the addition of land omitted
from a deed. See pt. V, § A of this Comment.
149. But see text accompanying notes 76-79 supra.
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anything which is linguistically and legally necessary to make the written
instrument truly reflect the complete agreement.
IV. PARTIES TO THE ACTION
A. Persons Subject to the Remedy
1. In General
The original parties to a written instrument are normally- subject
to an action for reformation. 150 Moreover, reformation may be granted
against many third parties claiming through the original parties.151 The
Missouri Supreme Court stated these principles in Sicher v. Rambousek
when it said that equity
will exercise this power not only as between the original parties,
but as to those claiming under them in privity, such as personal
representatives, heirs, assigns, grantees, judgment creditors, or
purchasers with notice of the facts.1 52
2. Intervening Bona Fide Purchaser or Encumbrancer;
Holder in Due Course
One party against whom Anglo-American courts generally will not
grant reformation is the bona fide purchaser. When a bona fide purchaser
intervenes without notice of the variance in the original instrument and
purchases for value, he is protected by the courts.153 This doctrine is no
different from the protection which a bona fide purchaser is generally
afforded in our legal system, and the policy considerations are the same
here as in the other situations. The bona fide purchaser is seen as stand-
ing upon a higher equity than the person seeking reformation. The Mis-
souri Supreme Court followed this doctrine in denying relief in American
Bank v. Bray. 54 A grantee from a bona fide purchaser should be pro-
tected by the intervention of the bona fide purchaser and not be subject
to reformation even though the grantee had notice. A recent Minnesota
decision supports this position, 5 5 but the question has never been de-
cided in Missouri.
The same policy considerations have prompted the Missouri courts,
as well as those in other jurisdictions, to deny relief against lienholders or
other encumbrancers who obtained such interest without notice of the
150. But see pt. III, § B (2) of this Comment. The grantor of a voluntary con-
veyance is an exception to this rule in some situations.
151. See 45 Am. JUR. Reformation of Instruments § 66 (1943).
152. 193 Mo. 113, 129, 91 S.W. 68, 72 (1906). The court repeated this statement
in a more recent case, Walters v. Tucker, 308 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Mo. 1957).
153. See Annots., 79 A.L.R.2d 1180 (1961), 44 A.L.R. 78 (1926). The English
rule is the same. Keeton, Rectification of Instruments for Mistake in England, 14
N.Y.U.L. REv. 319 (1937). What constitutes notice in Missouri and other states is,
of course, relevant to whether the party against whom reformation is sought is a
bona fide purchaser. See, e.g., Sicher v. Rambousek, 193 Mo. 113, 129, 91 S.W. 68,
72 (1906).
154. 321 Mo. 576, 11 S.W.2d 1016 (1928).
155. Aldrich v. Wilson, 265 Minn. 150, 159, 120 N.W.2d 849, 855 (1963).
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variance in the written instrument.150 In Cass County v. Oldham,i 7
Oldham executed a mortgage to the plaintiff, but the description in the
written instrument was incomplete. Oldham then executed a deed of trust
on the same property to Freese, who had no actual notice of the first
mortgage. Freese later purchased the tract at the foreclosure sale pursuant
to his deed of trust. Plaintiff then sued for reformation of the mortgage
which Oldham had executed to it. The Missouri Supreme Court denied
relief, holding that the record of the mortgage was not constructive notice
to Freese because of the incomplete description; and since there was no
evidence of actual notice, "Freese was not only a purchaser without notice,
but he was also an incumbrancer for value."'158 Thus, plaintiff could
not get reformation against Freese.
The rights of a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument may
also be-superior to those of a party seeking reformation. To the extent
that one is a holder in due course as defined in the Missouri statutes,159
he takes the instrument free from "all defenses of any party to the instru-
ment with whom the holder has not dealt except ... (c) such misrepresen-
tation as has induced the party to sign the instrument with neither knowl-
edge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character
or its essential terms ... ."160 The draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial
Code indicate in the comments that the test for failure to obtain knowledge
is "excusable negligence."''1 Thus, unless the misrepresentation meets
this test, the holder in due course should take free of the defense of reforma-
tion.1 62
The above doctrines present very big obstacles to the party seeking
reformation of the written instrument. First of all, that party may not
discover the variance in the written instrument until after the other party
has transferred or conveyed his interest in the instrument for value to
a third party who has no notice of the variance. Second, there is a danger
that the other party could transfer or convey his interest after the variance
is discovered but before the petitioner can get the instrument reformed.
Thus, when a negotiable instrument is involved, the petitioner may want
to seek a temporary restraining order to keep the other party from trans-
ferring the instrument to a holder in due course who could successfully
156. In most states, the judgment creditor is not so protected. See pt. IV,
§ A (3) of this Comment.
157. 75 Mo. 50 (1881).
158. Id. at 52.
159. See § 400.3-302, RSMo 1969 (UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-302). Even
a payee may be a holder in due course in certain circumstances. § 400.3-302 (2),
supra. See generally Comment, The Concept of Holder in Due Course in Article III
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 COLUm. L. R~v. 1573 (1968).
160. §- 400.3-305 (2) (c), RSMo 1969 (UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-305 (2) (c)).
161. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-305, Comment 7 (1962 version). This
comment and the test outlined therein was adopted in Burchett v. Allied Concord
Financial Corp., 74 N.M. 575, 396 P.2d 186 (1964), which is a rescission case.
162. Although there is little authority, several courts have held that a holder
in due course takes free of an equity of rescission when the party seeking rescission
cannot meet the "excusable negligence" test. Waterbury Savings Bank v. Jaroszewski,
4 Conn. Cir. 620, 238 A.2d 446 (1967); Burchett v. Allied Concord Financial Corp.,
74 N.M. 575, 396 P.2d 186 (1964).
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defend against an action for reformation. If granted, the temporary
restraining order would protect the petitioner from running up against
the holder-in-due-course defense. For further protection the petitioner
could ask the court to take possession of the instrument.
When the instrument is a contract to convey land, a deed or a deed
of trust, lis pendens filing will protect the petitioner from third party
defenses. The filing is constructive notice to all potential purchasers.l 6a
In Missouri lis pendens notice must be filed if a civil action involving land
is equitable in whole or in part;164 therefore, the petitioner in a reforma-
tion action must file.
3. Judgment Creditors
Missouri follows the general rule' 65 that an instrument may be re-
formed against judgment creditors. 166 However, in some states the liens
of judgment creditors stand upon the same footing as the liens of bona
fide emcumbrancers of the property or as the rights of bona. fide pur-
chasers.167 This is the law of Mississippi, for example.168 Commentators
have criticized the Mississippi view:
On principle, a judgment creditor accedes only to the legal in-
terest of the debtor, whatever that interest might be. Hence he is
not a bona fide purchaser who takes by reason of an independent
equity. In this respect there should be no serious obstacle to
relief either against a judgment creditor or a purchaser at an
execution sale .. . . In the case of Nugent v. Priebatsch it was
held that the Recording Act [Miss. Code 1880, section 1212] was
conclusive against the right to reformation where the interest of
a judgment creditor had intervened .... The conclusion reached
in this case appears highly debatable both from the standpoint
of legal accuracy and policy. Although all interests subject to
record are void as against creditors and subsequent purchasers
unless recorded, nevertheless it is universally admitted that inter-
ests in land arising solely by implication of law and hence im-
possible of record do not come within the purview of recording
acts. Nor was this denied in the Priebatsch case. The necessary
implication, rather, was that an equity of reformation could not
be deemed an unrecordable interest.' 69
B. Persons Entitled to Relief
1. In General
Again, the general rule is that either party to a written instrument
is entitled to reformation as well as those who claim through them. 70
This is the rule in Missouri, and the language in Sicher v. Rambousek
163. § 527.260, RSMo 1969.
164. Id.
165. See generally Annot., 44 A.L.R. 78, 103 (1926).
166. Young v. Coleman, 43 Mo. 179 (1869), aff'd sub nom. Young v. Cason,
48 Mo. 259 (1871).
167. Annot., 44 A.L.R. 78, 107 (1926).
168. Nugent v. Priebatsch, 61 Miss. 402 (1883).
169. Malone & Keesee, supra note 135, at 339.
170. 45 Am. JUR. Reformation of Instruments § 63 (1943).
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quoted earlier 171 is again appropriate. The Kansas City Court of Appeals
has also upheld the right of a third party entitled to maintain an action
at law on a contract between other parties to sue for reformation of that
contract. In Binswanger v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp.,172 the
plaintiff was injured on the grounds of a funeral home because of the
latter's negligence. The funeral home had a contract of liability insurance
with defendant expressly providing that an injured party could sue de-
fendant on the contract. Plaintiff was held entitled to sue for reformation
since she was entitled to sue on the contract itself.17s
2. The Donee in a Gratuitous Conveyance
The rule is usually stated that an instrument representing a gratuitous
conveyance cannot be reformed, but exceptions nearly engulf the rule. 7 4
The most important exception allows the donor reformation against the
donee. Some jurisdictions, including Missouri, extend this right to the
donor's heirs or successors. 175 Another possible exception would allow
one donee reformation against another donee.176 Several commentators
have noted that the courts will struggle very hard to find consideration in
such a case so that reformation may be allowed.177 Therefore, about all
that remains of the "rule" is that a donee in a gratuitous conveyance
cannot obtain reformation against the donor.178 This would seemingly
be explained by the discretionary nature of the remedy, 79 the argument
being that a court should not, as a matter of policy, reform a purely
gratuitous conveyance against the will of the donor. In Mudd v. DillonsO
the Missouri Supreme Court denied reformation of a description in a
gratuitous conveyance when the petitioner-donee sought relief against
his donor.
There is a split of authority as to whether a donee may obtain relief
against the donor's heirs. Although the weight of authority says he can-
not,18 one can construct a persuasive argument that he should be able
to do so. Since the donor died thinking that his intent was successfully
effectuated by the written instrument, and since more likely than not
171. 193 Mo. 113, 129, 91 S.W. 68, 72 (1906). See note 152 and accompanying
text supra.
172. 224 Mo. App. 1025, 28 S.W.2d 448 (K.C. Ct. App. 1930).
173. See Annot., 112 A.L.R. 909 (1938). The right of the present claimant of
title to correct an error in description as against the original or intermediate grantor
is treated in Annot., 89 A.L.R. 1444 (1934).
174. 76 C.J.S. Reformation of Instruments § 10 (1952). Although the term
"voluntary" (conveyance) is very often employed by the courts and commentators,
"gratuitous" is a more acurate adjective, and it shall be used herein.
175. Phillips v. Cope, 11l S.W.2d 81 (1937) (grantor's heir obtained reforma.
tion of a deed of gift); 76 C.J.S. Reformation of Instruments § 10, at 334 (1952).
176. Reinberg v. Heiby, 404 111. 247, 88 N.E.2d 848 (1949).
177. Hermann, Reformation and Rescission, 1960 ILL. L.F. 1, 20-22; Malone &
Keesee, supra note 135, at 340-41.
178. MCCLINTOCK, § 101, at 271.
179. See pt. 1, § B (1) of this Comment. Of course, in most cases the donor
will willingly correct the "mistake."
180. 166 Mo. 110, 65 S.W. 973 (1901).
181. 45 AM. JUR. Reformation of Instruments § 30 (1943).
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he would have voluntarily corrected the variance in the written instrument
if he had known about it, the heirs should not benefit from the variance.' 82
Apparently, there has been no decision on this question in Missouri. s'8
Although Missouri and other courts will not grant relief to a donee
against 'his donor, the petitioner can always get around that rule if he
can persuade the court that there was some consideration involved. The
equitable requirement is not difficult to meet: "[lIt is not required that
there be a valuable consideration sufficient to support a contract at law
before a court of equity will reform an instrument; it is enough if there
is a good or equitable consideration. ... 184 The petitioner may show
equitable consideration via some relationship of love and affection. In
Partridge v. Partridge'1 5 the children and heirs at law of James M. Par-
tridge sued his widow and her children by a former marriage for partition
of certain real estate. The widow claimed under a deed of gift to her from
James which he gave her for her support. She alleged that the deed varied
materially from the complete agreement and counterclaimed for reforma-
tion. The court held that there was meritorious consideration as between
the grantor (James) and the grantee (his widow) and granted reforma-
tion. An older case in accord is Hutsel v. Crewse, 8s in which a parent-
child relationship was held sufficient. The donee may also get around
this rule if he has relied detrimentally on the conveyance so that promis-
sory estoppel may substitute for consideration. 8 7 As previously noted, the
courts seem to struggle very hard to find consideration when a donee sues
another donee for reformation.
V. DEFENSES
In prior discussion several defenses have been raised which may be
available to the party against whom reformation is sought. He may argue
that the mistake was of law, not fact, and that equity will not reform a
mistake of law.'88 He may have a good defense if the written instrument
is a type which the court will not reform: a sheriff's deed, a will, or a deed
of trust after foreclosure.' 8 9 He will have a good defense if he is a bona
fide purchaser from the original grantor, an intervening encumbrancer,
a holder in due course' 90 or a donor in a voluntary conveyance. 19 And in
some states he will prevail if he is an intervening judgment creditor.192
At this point four other possible defenses will be considered in detail.
182. This argument is persuasively put in McLane, Equity-May Voluntaiy
Grantees Obtain Reforraation of a Deed over the Opposition of the Grantor's
Heirs?, 25 GA. B.J. 445, 446 (1963).
183. The Missouri Supreme Court avoided the question in Partridge v. Par-
tridge, 220 Mo. 321, 119 S.W. 415 (1909), holding that there was meritorious con-
sideration and that the deed could be reformed.
184. MCCLINTOCK, § 101, at 272.
185. 220 Mo. 321, 119 S.W. 415 (1909).
186. 138 Mo. 1, 39 S.W. 449 (1897).
187. McCLiNTocK, § 101, at 273.
188. See pt. II, § A () of this Comment.
189. See pt. III, § A (2) of this Comment.
190. See pt. IV § A (1) of this Comment.
191. See pt. IV, § B (2) of this Comment.
192. See pt. IV, § A (2) of this Comment.
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A. Statute of Frauds
Suppose Smith conveys Blackacre to Jones. The only written instru-
ment is the deed, which varies from the complete agreement in that it
describes only half of Blackacre. Smith refuses to execute a- new deed,
so Jones institutes an action for reformation. Is the Statute of Frauds
a defense to reformation?
It is helpful to review the development of the English law on this
issue.193 At least for a time in England, rectification 194 was available only
where the instrument sought to be rectified was preceded by an enforce-
able contract.1 95 Thus, where the agreement was one which had to be
evidenced by a writing under the Statute of Frauds, it was held that a
plaintiff could not use parol evidence to show that an executory written
agreement was not the complete agreement.19 6 However, in 1924 this
position was reversed:
It was further suggested that the present action involved an at-
tempt to enforce a parol contract inconsistently with the principle
of the Statute of Frauds. It is, however, well settled by a series of
familiar authorities that the Statute of Frauds is not allowed
by any court administering the doctrines of equity to become an
instrument for enabling sharp practice to be committed .... The
statute, in fact, only provides that no agreement not in writing
and not duly signed shall be sued on; but when the written instru-
ment is rectified there is a writing which satisfies the Statute, the
jurisdiction of the Court to rectify being outside the prohibition
of the statute.197
The majority American view is the same. When a particular formality
is required to make the agreement binding, reformation cannot be granted
to supply the needed formality; 198 but if the instrument has been executed
in the proper form, reformation can be granted to correct any variance
from the complete agreement. 199 That is, a court will reform a term which
is required by the Statute to be in writing, but it will not supply the term
if omitted altogether.
The Restatement of Contracts espouses the rather odd view that ref-
ormation of a contract required by the Statute of Frauds to be in writing
should be permitted only when there has been part performance or when
the contract has been executed.2 00 Professor McClintock criticized this
rule:
193. The author relied heavily on Keeton, supra note 153, for this background
information.
194. Rectification is the English version of reformation. See pt. I, § A of this
Comment.
195. Keeton, supra note 153, at 321.
196. Woollam v. Hearn, 32 Eng. Rep. 86 (Ch. 1802).
197. United States v. Motor Trucks, Ltd., [1924] A.C. 196, 200-01 (P.C.).
198. This first statement is a corollary of the rule that the court cannot supply
a term to the "complete" agreement which is essential to a valid contract. See text
accompanying note 1 supra. See Devlen v. Wilkinson, 473 S.W.2d 357, 361-62 (Mo.
1971).
199. McCLiNTocK, § 103.
200. RESTATEMENT OF Co Paars § 509(2) (1932).
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The comment gives no reason for the limitation of the remedy,
which is against the clear weight of American authority, and it is
not obvious why the law should not extend the protection of this
remedy to the expectation interest under a purely executory
agreement .... 201
Massachusetts and South Carolina take an even more radical position.
They refuse to reform deeds where the effect would be to convey more
land than was included or described in the deed.20 2 Their contention is
that allowing reformation would be tantamount to giving legal effect to
terms in parol which the statute required to be in writing. Under this
view hypothetical Mr. Jones would fail in his effort to reform his deed
from Smith even though the parties did indeed intend to convey all of
Blackacre, not just that portion of it which was described in the deed.
Even Massachusetts and South Carolina courts would, however, allow
reformation if the court could find a sufficient change in position or other
acts which would take the case out from under the Statute of Frauds.20 3
Of course, rescission may be an alternative.2 04
The Missouri courts seem to follow the majority view in applying
the Missouri statutes of fraud20 5 although there is very little authority.
Strothcamp v. Sandy I'ord Ranch, Inc.2 00 is apparently the only reported
201. McCLINTOCK, § 103.
202. Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24, 3 Am. Rep. 418 (1869); Westbrook v.
Harbeson, 2 S.C.Eq. 112 (1827).
[W]e are satisfied that, upon principle, the conveyance of land cannot
be decreed in equity by reason merely of an oral agreement therefor,
against a party denying the alleged agreement and relying upon the
statute of frauds .... This rule applies as well to the enforcement of such
agreement by way of rectifying a deed, as to a direct suit for its specific
performance. We are satisfied also that this is the rule to be derived from
a great preponderance of the authorities [citing, inter alia, Woollam v.
Hearn, 32 Eng. Rep. 86 (Ch. 1802); See text accompanying note 196
supra].
Glass v. Hulbert, supra at 48, 3 Am. Rep. at 484.
203. See, e.g., Potter v. Jacobs, 111 Mass. 32 (1872).
204. Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24, 84-85, 8 Am. Rep. 418, 426-27 (1869).
205. § 432.010, RSMo 1969, applies to contracts:
No action shall be brought . . . upon any contract made for the sale of
lands, tenements, hereditaments, or an interest in or concerning them, or
any lease thereof, for a longer time than one year, or upon any agreement
that is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof, un-
less the agreement upon which the action shall be brought, or some
memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing and signed by the party
to be charged therewith, or some other person by him thereto lawfully
authorized... (emphasis added).
§ 432.050, RSMo 1969, applies to conveyances:
All leases, estates, interests of freehold or term of years, or any uncertain
interest of, in, to or out of any messuages, lands, tenements or heredita-
ments, made or created by livery and seisin only, or by parol, and not put
in writing and signed by the parties so making or creating the same, or
their agents lawfully authorized by writing, shall have the force and effect
of leases or estates at will only, and shall not, either in law or equity, be
deemed or taken to have any other or greater force.
206. 440 S.W.2d 193 (St. L. Mo. App. 1969).
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case in which the Statute of Frauds has been raised as a defense to reforma-
tion. The parties had agreed upon a warranty deed by which the defendant
was to convey land to the plaintiff. However, the defendant fraudulently
inserted a restrictive clause after the deed was executed. The St. Louis
Court of Appeals granted reformation:
Defendant cites no authority for the proposition that reforma-
tion must be preceded by an enforceable contract. To say that
this is a prerequisite to reformation would ignore the maxim that
the statute of frauds is designed to prevent fraud and may not be
used by a defendant as a shelter to avoid the penalty of his own
fraud.207
Arguably, this language restricts the applicability of Strothcamp to cases
involving fraud by the party against whom reformation is sought. However,
there is no reason to suspect that the rule would differ in cases where
there was no fraud. The rule in Missouri is probably that, when the instru-
ment has been executed in the proper form, reformation can be granted
to correct any variance from the complete agreement. This is in line with
the majority American and English view, which is the most equitable
and best-reasoned approach. Moreover, the reasoning of the leading English
case is applicable to the Missouri statute which applies to contracts: 208
The Statute, in fact, only provides that an agreement not in
writing and not duly signed shall not be sued on; but when the
written instrument is rectified there is a writing which satisfies
the Statute, the jurisdiction of the court to rectify being outside
the prohibition of the Statute.209
B. Petitioner's Negligence as a Bar
1. The General Rule
Whether petitioner's negligence is a bar to an action for reformation
is a troublesome question. The answer varies with each jurisdiction, factual
situation and trial judge. Most jurisdictions recite that the petitioner's
negligence may be a valid defense,2 10 but it is not dear how many actually
apply the rule to deny relief.211 The Illinois courts require the negligence
to amount to a "violation of a positive legal duty"' 212 while others require
some other degree of negligence, e.g., "gross," "culpable" or "inexcusa-
ble."2 13
207. Id. at 197.
208. § 432.010, RSMo 1969, quoted note 205 supra.
209. United States, v. Motor Trucks, Ltd., [1924] A.G. 196, 201 (P.C.). This
language is not applicable to § 432.050, RSMo 1969, quoted note 205 supra, which
applies to conveyances.
210. 45 AM. JUR. Reformation of Instruments § 78 (1943); see Annot., 81
A.L.R.2d 7 (1962).
211. Some courts have held that negligence is not a bar in any case. See au-
thorities cited note 236 infra.
212. Pearce v. Osterman, 343 Ill. 175, 175 N.E. 416 (1931); Hermann, Ref-
ormation and Rescission, 1960 ILL. L.F. 1, 42.
213. Scoville v. Hampton, 217 Ore. 256, 259, 335 P.2d 399, 401, rev'd, 340 P.2d
952 (1959) ("gross"); but see Kontz v. B.P. John Furniture Corp., 167 Ore. 187,
1972]
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In early cases the Missouri Supreme Court espoused the view that
negligence might bar an action for reformation. 214 But more than ordinary
negligence is required. The descriptive term which has apparently been
settled on is "inexcusable negligence." 215 However, no Missouri court has
ever denied reformation explicitly on the grounds that petitioner was
inexcusably negligent although several cases are constantly cited as so
holding.2'8 The most that can be said is that petitioner's negligence is
used as a "make weight" argument if the court decided to deny reforma-
tion on some other ground.2 17
Nonetheless, some annotators have said that Missouri courts have
denied reformation on the ground that the petitioner was negligent. 18
Indeed, in several cases reformation of insurance contracts has been denied
to a petitioner who failed to read the contract and object to the variance
within a reasonable time after he received the contract.21 9 However, the
real basis for these decisions was that the policy or certificate as written
was itself the complete agreement of the parties and, therefore, there was
no variance. Evers v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen220 is a repre-
sentative case. Plaintiff, the assignee of the insured, alleged that defendant's
agent had represented to the insured that the certificate of insurance would
provide benefits for "every kind" of total and permanent disability. BuL
the certificate, by reference to the brotherhood's constitution, limited the
206, 115 P.2d 319, 327 (1941) (dictum that negligence is never a bar in Oregon);
Taylor v. Burns, 250 Ala. 218, 221, 34 So. 2d 5, 8 (1948) ("culpable"); In re Millers
Estate, 226 S.W. 302, 304 (St. L. Mo. App. 1920) ("inexcusable"). See generally
Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 7, 19-23 (1962).
214. The statement most often quoted in later Missouri decisions was made by
the Missouri Supreme Court as obiter dictum in Miller v. St. Louis &: K.C. Ry.,
162 Mo. 424, 441, 63 S.W. 85, 89 (1901): "The party who seeks the equitable re-
lief [of reformation] must show that he was without negligence in the matter.
Equity does not interfere to relieve men of the consequences of their own careless-
ness."
215. In re Miller's Estate, 226 S.W. 302, 304 (St. L. Mo. App. 1920).
216. These cases merely state and do not hold that negligence is a bar: Austin
v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co., 285 S.W. 1015 (Spr. Mo. App. 1926); In re Miller's
Estate, 226 S.W. 302 (St. L. Mo. App. 1920); Spelman v. Delano, 187 Mo. App. 119,
172 S.W. 1163 (K.C. Ct. App. 1915); Young v. Marion Sims College of Medicine, 91
Mo. App. 214 (St. L. Ct. App. 1901). These cases are often cited and are illustra-
tive. Austin is a rescission case and therefore not valid precedent. See pt. I, § C
of this Comment. In Spelman the court stated that petitioner's negligence would
have barred reformation, but reformation was not prayed for. Spelman v. Delano,
supra at 121, 172 S.W. at 1163. In Young the court stated at one point that there
was not sufficient evidence of the complete agreement. Young v. Marion Sims
College of Medicine, supra at 219. Reformation was denied on other grounds in
In re Miller's Estate, supra at 304.
217. Commentators in other states have also noticed this tendency to rely on
petitioner's negligence only to "make weight." See Malone & Keesee, The Ref-
ormation of Writings Under the Law of Mississippi, 8 Miss. L.J. 329, 345-46 (1936).
218. See Annots., 32 A.L.R.3d 661, 721 (1970), 81 A.L.R.2d 7, 85 (1962).
219. The cases relied on by the annotators include: Evers v. Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen, 172 S.W.2d 899 (K.C. Mo. App. 1943); Steward v. Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 127 S.W.2d 22 (K.C. Mo. App. 1939): Peterson v. Commonwealth Cas. Co., 212
Mo. App. 434, 249 S.W. 148 (Spr. Ct. App. 1923); McHoney v. German Ins. Co.,
52 Mo. App. 94 (St. L. Ct. App. 1892).
220. 172 S.W.2d 899 (KC. Mo. App. 1943).
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types of disability for which the insured could receive benefits. The
insured was given a certificate and a copy of the constitution. He examined
the certificate when delivered but he made no complaint until five years
later, after he had been disabled in a manner which did not give him
the right to benefits under the certificate (and constitution) as written.
Suit was instituted to reform the certificate so that it would correctly
express the alleged complete agreement. The court in effect assumed the
above allegations were true but denied reformation saying that plaintiff's
claim was barred by the insured's delay in objecting to the "variance"
in the certificate.
What the Evers court probably meant to say was that the application
and negotiations amounted to an offer to the defendant and that the
certificate which varied from the offer was a counter-offer which the in-
sured accepted by his silence and failure to object within a reasonable
time after receipt. The court relied heavily on American Insurance Co. v.
Neiberger,221 which held as follows:
When the application does not attempt to set forth all the
provisions which the policy to be issued must contain, and the
agent, with or without authority, represents that the policy will
contain certain stipulations, which are not unlawful, then the
policy must contain them, or the insured will not be bound to
accept it. But in such case it will be the duty of the insured when
he receives the policy promptly to examine the same, and if it
does not contain the stipulations agreed upon, to at once notify
the company of such fact, and of his refusal to accept said
policy .... After such delay, he will be deemed to have accepted
the policy as issued.222
The wisdom of the Neiberger rule is not at issue here. However, it does
help explain Evers and cases like it. If the Neiberger rule is applied, the
written policy is itself the complete agreement between the parties since
the policy itself was a counteroffer which the insured accepted by his
silence. Thus, the reason that reformation is not available is that the
written instrument does not vary from the complete agreement.2 28
Supporting this analysis is the fact that when the courts can find a
complete agreement underlying the insurance policy which varies there-
from they will reform the policy. In Peterson v. Commonwealth Casualty
Co.,22 4 the court found a complete agreement had been made before the
application was sent to the insurer and that the written policy varied
materially from it. Reformation was allowed. Unfortunately, the court
stated that reformation would have been denied had the delay been
greater than the five days between petitioner's receipt of the policy and
his objection to it. However, this statement is dearly dictum and does
not hold up under scrutiny. Although the Neiberger rule is the basis for
221. 74 Mo. 167 (1881).
222. id. at 173 (emphasis added).
223. A recent case properly applies the Neiberger rule without speaking of
negligence." See Galemore v. Haley, 471 S.W.2d 518, 525 (Spr. Mo. App. 1971).
224. 212 Mo. App. 434, 249 S.W. 148 (Spr. Ct. App. 1923).
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cases relied on by the court, it does not apply because a complete agree-
ment was made before the application was sent to the insurer. It applies
only when the application is an offer and the varying policy is therefore
a counteroffer. The statute of limitations or laches may be a defense, 22 5
but any delay less than that required for those defenses should not bar
reformation.
Thus, arguably, these cases provide questionable support for the an-
notators' proposition that negligence was the ground upon which the
courts denied relief. All of the cases relied upon by the annotators involve
insurance contracts, where the Neiberger rule comes into play.226 More-
over, in none of these insurance cases is the analysis normally applied to
the negligence defense relied on by the courts.227 The courts apply Nei-
berger, but disconcertingly speak of "negligence" and "laches" 22 8 as defenses
to reformation while they are really applying a contracts principle. The
confusion arises from the fact that the Neiberger rule does involve unrea-
sonable delay, i.e., negligent delay. Only when the application is a mere
offer does the failure to object to the varying policy within a reasonable
time operate as acceptance of the policy (counteroffer). In that case the
written instrument is the complete agreement, and the petitioner cannot
make out a prima facie case for reformation.
2. Limitations on the Rule
Perhaps one reason that petitioner's negligence has never been applied
to bar relief in Missouri is that the courts have placed three major limita-
tions on the doctrine. First, negligence is not a defense when the party
against whom reformation is sought has not been harmed by the petition-
er's negligence.229 Second, negligence has been held not to be a defense
when both parties were equally at fault.23 0 Finally, in a recent case the
St. Louis Court of Appeals said emphatically that petitioner's negligence
should not bar reformation when the party against whom relief is sought
fraudulently introduced the variance into the written instrument:
225. See pt. V, § C of this Comment.
226. Cases cited note 219 supra.
227. See pt. V, § B (2) of this Comment.
228. This is not a true case of laches. Rather, laches would be a defense if the
petitioner delayed too long after discovering the variance. See pt. V, § C (2) of
this Comment. The delay important in these insurance cases is before the variance
is discovered.
229. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gilbert, 215 Mo. App. 201, 256 S.W. 148
(K.C. Ct. App. 1923). The petitioner-insurance company sought reformation of a
policy issued to defendant. The court allowed reformation, holding that negligence
was not a defense:
There was no injury caused the insured by the mistake made in the case
at bar. No rights of a third party have intervened nor have defendants
acted to their injury upon the assumption that the amount indorsed on
the policy was the true amount of paid-up insurance. Id. at 212-13, 256
S.W. at 152.
This limitation is applied in many jurisdictions. See Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 7, 18
(1962).
230. McVey v. Phillips, 259 S.W. 1065 (Mo. 1924); Conrath v. Houchin, 226
Mo. App. 261, 54 S.W.2d 190 (K.C. Ct. App. 1930). Many jurisdictions apply this
limitation. Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 7, 20 (1962).
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We have been cited to no case where such negligence [peti-
tioner's failure to read the instrument] has defeated reformation
for fraud or misplaced confidence, as in the case at bar. In our
opinion, it should not be applied in such cases ....
It would be a monstrous perversion of justice to deny plaintiff
the right of reformation upon the ground that she was negligent
in not reading the entire contract and in failing to read the note
and mortgage before signing the contract, under the facts and
circumstances shown. Defendant . . . by his attempt to take ad-
vantage of plaintiff's failure to discover the fraud does not assume
a position that commends him to a court of equity. It is incon-
sistent and inequitable for defendants to rely upon plaintiff's
negligence in failing to discover the fraud under the facts in this
case.
231
The inexcusably negligent petitioner may thus have three arguments at
his disposal to get him around the general rule. It is submitted that these
limitations make the doctrine virtually meaningless. In order for the negli-
gent petitioner to fall outside of the limitations protecting him, he must
have been inexcusably negligent with harm resulting to the party against
whom reformation is sought, and the latter must not have acted fraudu-
lently nor have been equally negligent. This situation will rarely, if ever,
arise.
Thus, the negligence doctrine appears to have little utility.282 Indeed,
if a situation was ever presented in which a court would desire to refuse
reformation because of petitioner's extraordinarily bad conduct, the court
could simply deny relief because of petitioner's unclean hands.233 The
specific negligence defense with all its intricacies would not be needed.
As a result, the court would be freed from confusing and time-consuming
argument and counter-argument on the negligence defense and its limita-
tions so that it could concentrate more fully on the determinative issues
in the lawsuit.
Many authorities have argued that negligence should not bar the
equitable relief of reformation in any case.23 4 The Restatement of Con-
tracts adopted this view, 235 and several states have adopted the Restate-
ment view. 286 Hopefully, the Missouri courts will recognize the merit of
this position in future decisions.
231. Sparks v. Sparks, 388 S.W.2d 508, 517 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965). For a state-
ment of the facts, see text accompanying notes 100-01 supra. This limitation is also
widely accepted. Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 7, 102 (1962); McCLINTOcK, § 98, at 265 n.41.
As the quoted language indicates, this limitation seems to be a special applica-
tion of the equitable "dean hands" doctrine. See McCLNToCx, § 26, for a discus-
sion of this doctrine.
232. However, when the party against whom reformation is sought is a holder
in due course, negligence is very important under the Missouri statutes (and the
Uniform Commercial Code). See text accompanying notes 159-162 supra.
233. See MCCLINTOCE, § 26, for a discussion of the "dean hands' doctrine.
234. MCCLINTOCK, § 98, at 267.
235. R STATEMENT OF CONTRAcrs § 508 (1932).
236. E.g., Bankers Fire Ins. Co. v. Henderson, 196 Va. 195, 209, 83 S.E.2d 424,
432 (1954). See generally Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 7, 17 (1962).
1972]
36
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [1972], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss1/8
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW3
C. Passage of Time as a Bar
1. Statutes of Limitation
In this section the discussion will focus exclusively on Missouri law.
Readers in other states may refer to two annotations as starting points in
determining the applicable statute in their state28 7 and when it starts to
run.
2 3 8
The Missouri statutes of limitation apply to equitable actions as well
as those at law.2 39 The first inquiries are what statute applies and when
does it begin to run. The controlling statute varies according to the type
of case. It has been said 24 0 that the statute generally applicable to suits
for reformation is section 516.110, RSMo 1969, which provides for a ten
year limitation in "[a]ctions for relief, not herein otherwise provided for."
This ten-year limitation has been applied several times to bar relief.2 4"
Whether the statute has tolled the right to relief often depends on
when the statute starts to run. In cases where there has been no fraud,
the Missouri courts have held that the statute runs from "the date the
right accrued,".24 2 i.e., from the date the instrument was executed. In cases
of fraud, other statutes discussed below govern the applicable time period
and the time when it begins to run.
At least one statute of limitations precludes the operation of section
516.110. In suits to reform deeds in order to recover the possession of land,
section 516.010 has been held to govern. 243 The courts have also stated
that the statute does not begin to run until the petitioner is ousted from
possession on the basis of the variance in the deed as written.244 However,
in Michel v. Tinsley245 the Missouri Supreme Court indicated that the
statute would start to run if the party in possession knew of the mistake
even though his possession was unchallenged.2 46 So, the attorney for the
237. Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 687 (1954).
238. Annot., 106 A.L.R. 1338 (1937). Warning: This annotation is incomplete
and thus defective in its analysis of Missouri law; see text accompanying notes 250-
51 infra.
239. Ludwig v. Scott, 65 S.W.2d 1034 (Mo. 1933).
240. Kithcart v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 150 F.2d 997 (8th Cir. 1945). This
case partially summarizes the Missouri decisions.
241. Stark v. Zehnder, 204 Mo. 442, 102 S.W. 992 (1907); Hoester v. Sammel-
mann, 101 Mo. 619, 14 S.W. 728 (1890).
242. Stark v. Zehnder, 204 Mo. 442, 451-52, 102 S.W. 992, 994-95 (1907).
243. Cooper v, Deal, 114 Mo. 527, 22 S.W. 31 (1893); State ex rel. Missouri
State Highway Comm'n v. Fitton, 180 S.W.2d 245 (Spr. Mo. App. 1944). §-516.010,
RSMo 1969, provides:
No action for the recovery of any lands, tenements or hereditaments, or
for the recovery of the possession thereof, shall be commenced, had or
maintained by any person, whether citizen, denizen, alien, resident or
nonresident of this state, unless it appear that the plaintiff, his ancestor,
predecessor, grantor or other person under whom he daims was seized or
possessed of the permises in question within ten years before the commence-
ment of such action.
244. Cooper v. Deal, 114 Mo. 527, 534, 22 S.W. 31, 36 (1893); State ex rel.
Missouri State Highway Comm'n v. Fitton, 180 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Spr. Mo. App.
1944).
245. 65 Mo. 442 (1879).
246, Id. at 449.
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party in possession would be wise to advise his client to have the deed
reformed immediately.
When there is some fraud in the transaction, two other statutes come
into play. First, when the party against whom reformation is sought has
been guilty of "continuing fraud" to keep petitioner from discovering
the variance, section 516.280 delays the running of the statute until the
fraud ceases.247 In Citizens Bank v. Frazier2 48 this statute -was applied to
extend the normal ten-year limitation. Reformation was allowed even
though the instrument had been executed considerably more than ten
years before. Second, if the party against whom reformation is sought was
fraudulent in introducing the variance into the written instrument, sec-
tion 516.120 may preclude the operation of 516.110.249 Section 516.120
applies generally when relief is sought on the ground of fraud.2 0 The
aggrieved party has ten years within which to discover the fraud. Upon
discovery, he has five years to bring suit. So, this statute might extend
the limitation to fifteen years. Certainly, a petitioner should make the
argument that this statute applies if his action would be barred under
the general ten-year limitation.
These statutes, especially the general ten-year limitation, can be very
dangerous. Often the variance in the written instrument is not discovered
until long after the instrument was executed; and under the ten-year
statute at least, the statute starts to run at execution. However, the statutes
of limitation have not been relied on very often. In some cases where
the applicable statute would clearly have barred the action, the court
does not discuss the issue, perhaps because the party against whom reforma-
tion is sought failed to plead the statute as a defense.2 51 Some attorneys
may have relied on an annotator's statement that in Missouri the statute
does not begin to run until the mistake is discovered. 252 This is correct,
perhaps, when section 516.010 is the applicable statute,253 but certainly
not when section 516.110 is controlling. In making this sweeping state-
ment of Missouri law, the annotator relied on cases controlled by 516.010,
247. § 516.280, RSMo 1969, provides:
If any person, by absconding or concealing himself, or by any other im-
proper act, prevent the commencement of an action, such action may be
commenced within the time herein limited, after the commencement of
such action shall have ceased to be so prevented.
248. 352 Mo. 367, 177 S.W.2d 477 (1944). Section 516.110, RSMo 1969, was the
applicable statute.
249. Stark v. Zehnder, 204 Mo. 442, 453, 102 S.W. 992, 995 (1907).
250. Section 516.120, RSMo 1969, provides for a five-year limitation for:
(5) An action for relief on the ground of fraud, the cause of action in
such case to be deemed not to have accrued until the discovery by the
aggrieved party, at any time within ten years, of the facts constituting the
fraud.
251. E.g., Berry v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 224 Mo. App. 1207, 33 S.W.2d
1016 (St. L. Ct. App. 1931). The instrument was executed 20 years before the action
was brought; and the variance was discovered by the petitioner five years before.
There was no-evidence of fraud. Section 516.110 dearly tolled the right to reforma-
tion after ten years, but it was not raised as a defense.
252. See Annot., 106 A.L.R. 1338, 1339 (1937).
253. See text accompanying notes 242-44 supra.
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without mentioning the other Missouri statutes and the decisions based
on them.
2. Laches
Where the petitioner has unreasonably delayed the assertion of his
right to reformation until either the party against whom relief is sought
has acted in reliance or the circumstances have changed so as to result
in prejudice to the latter because of the delay, equity will hold the peti-
tioner to be guilty of laches and will deny relief to him.2 54 Some authorities
state that the delay alone is enough 255 but the better view would appear
to be that the passage of time must be accompanied by some prejudice
to the defendant. 256 Missouri adheres to the latter view. In Berry v. Con-
tinental Life Insurance Co.,257 plaintiff sued on the insurance contract.
Defendant counterclaimed for reformation to change the cash value of
the policy at the end of twenty years to the figure allegedly agreed upon.
Plaintiff asserted laches as a defense since the error was discovered five
years before the suit was brought. The court held that laches on these
facts was not a bar:
In the instant case, defendant's delay in no way injured plaintiff.
Plaintiff was entitled to receive what he applied for and paid for,
and defendant by its silence in no way acted to plaintiff's detri-
ment.25
8
The general rule is that ladies will not be imputed until the mistake is
discovered,2 59 but some courts have held to the contrary.2 60 There is no
suggestion in the Missouri decisions that the law in this state varies from
the sound majority rule.
If the party against whom reformation is sought was fraudulent, the
court is not likely to allow his defense of laches. Defendants had acted
fraudulently in the peculiar case of Lauffer v. Smith.261 The defense of
laches was denied even though the defendants had made valuable im-
provements on the land.
These restrictions on the defense of laches prevent its application in
most cases. However, in Davidson v. Mayhew262 the Supreme Court of
Missouri relied heavily on laches as a basis for denying reformation. The
plaintiffs discovered the alleged variance in the 1866 deed in 1880; but
they did not bring suit to reform the deed until 1899. Defendants had
been prejudiced by the delay since they had been forced to defend several
254. MCCLINTOCK, § 28 (a).
255. W. WALSH, EQUITY § 102 (1930). See Note, Passage of Time as Laches,
61 W. VA. L. REv. 126 (1959).
256. See Wallace v. Fiske, 80 F.2d 897, 912 (8th Cir. 1935).
257. 224 Mo. App. 1207, 33 S.W.2d 1016 (St. L. Ct. App. 1931).
258. Id. at 1213, 33 S.W.2d at 1019. Accord, Sicher v. Rambousek, 193 Mo. 113,
129, 91 S.W. 68, 72 (1906).
259. MCCLINTOCK, § 105, at 281.
260. E.g., Brooks v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 193 Ga. 522, 18 S.E.2d
860 (1942).
261. 337 Mo. 22, 85 S.W.2d 94 (1935).
262. 169 Mo. 258, 68 S.W. 1031 (1902).
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suits involving the same deed because of the alleged variance. However,
the court was not content to rely on laches alone to deny relief. It stated
strongly that the decision could have rested on the ground that the alleged
complete agreement was not satisfactorily proven.2 63
VI. CONCLUSION
Traditionally, the courts have said that the ground for the equitable
relief of reformation is that the parties had come to an understanding but
in reducing it to writing, through mutual mistake or mistake and fraud,
some provision was omitted or mistakenly inserted. This seems simple
enough, but in practice this analysis has proven misleading and inade-
quate. In theory, the courts should require only that the party seeking
reformation show that there was a complete agreement between the parties
and that the written instrument varies materially from it. This simple
analysis is not only adequate, but it also clearly underscores the ultimate
factual issue in any reformation action: the establishment of the complete
agreement.
Of course, there may be other obstacles which the successful litigant
must overcome. Equity courts categorically refuse to reform certain types
of instruments, notably wills. Furthermore, the party against whom reforma-
tion is sought may stand upon some equity higher than that of the party
seeking the reformation, as in the case of a bona fide purchaser, encum-
brancer or holder in due course. The party seeking reformation may be
the donee in a voluntary conveyance, in which case he will face special
obstacles. The statutes of limitation or petitioner's laches may also be a
bar. The former is often a problem since the variance which was intro-
duced into the written instrument is often not discovered until a con-
siderable time after the instrument is executed. Finally, petitioner's negli-
gence may be bothersome. It is often used as a "make-weight" argument
by the courts in supporting decisions denying reformation; but, standing
alone, it has never been relied upon by a Missouri court to deny relief.
This defense is of questionable value in theory and in practice and should
be repudiated by the courts.
All things considered, the courts have shrouded this remedy with so
many complexities that it has lost its basic simplicity. It is hoped that
this article will contribute to a return to the basic concept underlying
the remedy: that when two parties have reached an agreement and the
written instrument varies from it, the instrument should be reformed
absent a special equity favoring an intervening innocent party.
WILLIAM H. THOMAS, JR.
263. Id. at 267, 68 S.W. at 1034. The statute of limitations was not discussed.
Apparently, it was assumed that the statute governing actions to recover land (now
§ 516.010, RSMo 1969) was applicable. The ten-year limit would not have started
to run until 1895, when plaintiffs acquired whatever rights they had to possession
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